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ABSTRACT

Zirker, Daniel G., M.A.

Pall, 1976

Political Science

Politics and Institutionalized change* The Failure of
Regional Development Planning in Northeat Brazil, 1961196M139 PP-)
Director*

Dr. Leo Lott

This study was an attempt to explain the failure of re
gional political and socio-economic planning in Northeast
Brazil in the context of social science theories of politi
cal development. The focus of the research was on the
Northeast Development Superintendency, or the SUDENE, a
Brazilian agency empowered in 1959 to enact sweeping in
stitutional changes in the region.
The thesis is divided into three parts* the first is
a representation of the extreme poverty and privation of
the people of the region; the second is an analysis of the
structure, function, and ultimate failure of the SUDENE;
the third is a systems analysis of the relationship of the
SUDENE and the United States Alliance for Progress foreign
aid program. The latter includes summarization of rele
vant theories of functionalism and political development
in a comparative sense. Reference is made to basic works
including those by David Apter, Samuel Huntington, Gabriel
Almond, and Riordan Roett.
The conclusions of the thesis are as follows* first,
that regional development programs cannot overcome poverty
and privation in Brazil because these problems are not pri
marily regional, and because regional political elites
actively resist change on a regional level; second, that
personalism in Brazilian political institutions consti
tutes a serious impediment to lasting change; and third,
that United States foreign assistance tends to compete
with, rather than reinforce, programs of major political
and socio-economic change in Northeast Brazil.
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PREFACE

Poverty and privation are persistent elements of
the socio-economic environment of Northeast Brazil despite
intensive efforts to eliminate them through regional devel
opment programs initiated in the 1950s and 1960s.
This thesis will attempt to explain why government
planning of political and economic development in North
east Brazil has been, by and large, a failure.

To do

this, two factors which contribute to the inherent weak
nesses of regional planning ventures will be considered
and analyzed.
The first factor relates to the development and
functions of the Superintend£ncia de Desenvolvimento do
Nordeste, or the SUDENE— the organization with the primary
responsibility for coordinating and administrating develop
ment efforts in Northeast Brazil after I960.

The analysis

of the SUDENE will take into consideration not only its
evolution as a government agency, but also its capacity
to achieve both general goals, such as those just men
tioned, and very specific goals, such as the stimulation
of the "modernization" process at local and regional
levels, and the transformation of those elements of
iv

V

Northeastern culture which basically resist change.
A second factor will involve the inability of
regional development programs in general to achieve the
national cooperation in Brazil that they require.

This

stems from the competition between modernizing elites of
different regions for federal recognition and support,
and the effectiveness of the south-central regional in
terests in achieving this support to the exclusion of the
interests in other regions.
The focus of this thesis will center on regional
planning of social and political development in Northeast
Brazil.

Since planning efforts concerning this region

have been substantially increased since I960, it is this
time period which will receive the most attention.
A main endeavor of this thesis will be to define
the specific branches and functions of the SUDENE, to es
tablish a case study of the relationship between the
SUDENE and other development agencies in the Northeast,
and to articulate the structural shortcomings of the
SUDENE in light of the drastic modifications that it has
undergone since 1964,
The hypothesis of this thesis is that the resolution
of widespread conditions of poverty and privation in the
Northeast will be impossible as long as the interests of
that area are treated as regional, and therefore as
separate from those of the rest of Brazil.

This idea is

based on the manifest inadequacy of past and present
regional development programs in succeeding to any ap
preciable degree in resolving either their specific goals,
or the general problems of the Northeast.

Furthermore,

the hypothesis rests on the assumption that this condition
originates from the existence of competition between the
interests of regional modernizing elites in Brazil.

Since

development priorities for the Northeast contradict in
many respects the immediate interests of the south-central
regional elite, these priorities are not accorded the
cooperation that they require.

In short, regional plan

ning in Brazil emanates from the seat of federal power,
which is located near, and dominated by, the south-central
region.
I am grateful to have worked in the development
process in Northeast Brazil as a Peace Corps Volunteer
from June of 1970 to July of 1972.

The Northeast is a

region that more than compensates the visitor for its
widespread shortages of food, water, and housing with a
rich and unique cultural heritage.

Although my ex

periences working with the SUDENE have, I hope, added
some perspective to this thesis, I have taken pains to
substantiate my arguments with numerous sources, and to
avoid subjective references, for two reasons*

first, I

tend to discount the subjective character of my experiences
in Brazil.

I was not engaged in a systematic study of
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the SUDENE, and cannot therefore count my perceptions
as scientifically verified.

Second, the time period of

interest with regards to the SUDENE predates my exper
iences by ten years*

The people that I might have inter

viewed for this thesis had long since been replaced in
the SUDENE by 1970,
I want to express my profound gratitude to Dr. Leo
Lott, former Chairman of the Department of Political
Science and Professor of Political Science specializing
in Latin American Studies.

As chairman of my thesis

committee, Dr. Lott continued to offer the expert advise
and patient consideration that has characterized his role
in my undergraduate and graduate training,
I would also like to thank the two other members
of my thesis committee for their help in finalizing my
efforts*

Dr. Stan Rose, professor of Foreign Languages

and Brazilianist, whose knowledge and numerous suggestions
led to some important areas of research* and Dr, Louis
Hayes, professor of Political Science and Chairman of the
Department, whose expertise in the field of political
development added depth to my work.

CHAPTER I
A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION TO
THE PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPMENT IN
NORTHEAST BRAZIL
Economic, Socio-political and Demographic
Dimensions of Northeast Brazil
Economic Dimensions.

Northeast Brazil is a huge region

with an area of about 600,000 square miles and a popula
tion of roughly 23 million.*

A significant element in

retarding the population growth has been the forced mi
gration

due to periodic drought.

Although numerous re

gional development plans have been enacted, mostly in the
last twenty years, their effect has been minimal, as
Shepard Foreman explained in The Brazilian Peasantry.
It is said that the drought of 1877-78 took a toll of
over 500,000 human lives and dispatched an enormous
labor force to the Amazon rubber trails. Nearly one
hundred years later, the drought of 1970-71 killed un
told numbers of people and provoked the organization
of labor gangs for the construction of wells, dams,
and roads, a federal strategy for drought relief that
fails to recognize the fundamental social, economic,
and political problems that are the basic scourge of
the landscape.2
The periodic drought, then, tends to complicate adequate
statistical analysis of the region.

Periodic onslaughts

mean that a durable status quo, at least for a majority of
1

the population, does not exist.

It is for this reason

that Riordan Roett has noted that "economic indicators
place the area in the same category with underdeveloped
zones of Asia and Africa*

high illiteracy, malnutrition,

inadequate education and housing, and an antiquated agrar
ian establishment that remains immune to change.
The per capita standard of living is an extremely
difficult indicator to estimate in a country as large and
economically diverse as is Brazil.

In I960, the last year

for which many of the relaible regional statistics are available, per capita income for all of Brazil was $280(US)j
Brazil was ranked seventh in Latin America in per capita
income.^

The breakdown of this figure for the Northeast

is dramatic, however.

Per capita income in the Northeast

in I960 was $160, whereas it was $410 in the South.

These

figures do not account for periodic droughts and natural
disasters of less frequent nature, nor do they explain the
extreme polarization between urban and rural income levels.
Furthermore, although rural subsistence in the Northeast
does not necessarily require measurable income during bene
ficial climatic periods, it becomes an absolute necessity
in time of drought.

This renders even more meaningful £

Stefan Robock's comment that "income is more unequally dis
tributed in a poorer region like the Northeast than in a
richer and more industrialized region like the South ."5
Food suply is a critical measurement of the ability
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of a region to withstand periodic catastrophy of the mag
nitude of the seca, of drought.

The World Hoodbook of Po

litical and Social Indicators ranks Brazil as relatively
high in national food supply* placing it at 26.5 out of
107.

Brazil is said to average 71 grams of protein and

2950 calories per day per capita.*’

The regional break

down, however, is again very striking.

As the Area Hand

book for Brazil, 1971 explains, "in the late 1960s the av
erage in the Northeast was less than 1500 calories."

It

continuess
In the impoverished Northeast, a chronically depressed
area, which has been exporting people to the cities of
the East and the South in a steady flow since the last
decades of the nineteenth century, the average number
of calories consumed in the late 1960s included 76 per
cent carbohydrates(cereals, yuca, manioc, potatoes, and
sugar), Ik percent protein(primarily meat and fish),
and 5 percent animal and vegetable fats. Protein in
take represented, on the average, a little more than
half the amount considered necessary for an adequate
diet.7
These figures indicate that subsistence farming in the
Northeast provides, in general, little more than the bar
est subsistence, and this factor explains the devastating
effects of drought.
Educational Dimensions.

Literacy rates in Brazil strongly

reflect the disparity between urban and rural sectors.
According to the UN Statistical Yearbook. 1971.

the urban

population of Brazil was about 79•9 percent literate(al
though no precise definition of literacy is established)
in 1970, whereas the rural population was 39.1 percent

g
literate(tooth figures for 15 years and older).
A 1968 survey of literacy among people between the
ages of fourteen and thirty four in parts of the South,
East, and Northeast regions indicated a wide disparity
between urban and rural localities and between regions.
The lowest rate was in the Northeast, where 77*7 per
cent of the urban and 44*9 percent of the rural dwel
lers were literate. The highest was in Sao Paulo State0
where urban and ruralQliteracy rates were 93*5 and 82.5
percent respectively.9
It must be added, however, that in a cultural sense large
and statistically significant areas of the Brazilian backlands have not tradtionally played a part in that nation's
social research; if this factor is coupled with loose stan
dards of literacy, it becomes difficult to corroborate even
as modest a literacy average as 44,9 percent.

Shepard Fore

man noted after over a decade of research in the rural sec
tor of the Northeast that
Illiteracy still runs well over $0 percent in Brazil
and up to 100 percent in some rural areas. Rural Pri
mary schools are often taught by semi-literates, who,
with no pedagogic materials, can provide little more
than knowledge of the alphabet through repititious cop
ying of the ABCs and some rudimentary mathematics.
Education has traditionally been limited in Brazil.
As a colony, Brazil— perhaps more than any other Latin Amer
ican colony— was tied either to the educational facilities
of Portugal, or to those limitied facilities provided by
11
the Jesuits.
The Jesuits adhered to a firm policy of
social preference in the provision of education, and even
"elementary schools served the aristocracy,"*-^
The expulsion of the Jesuits in 1759 destroyed the
limited educational facilities that had existed.

5
An attempt was made to institute a more nearly
universal system, but this failed, primarily be
cause of lack of interest and organization.* 3
After independence, a rapid growth of private secondary
schooling occurred, most notably in the mid 1800s, and by
the end of that century several colleges had been establish
ed.*^

But despite periodic reforms and development efforts,

including those of the 1930s and 1960s, Brazilian "edu
cation retains the prestige held since colonial days when
••1 5

it was the privilege of the small upper class.

Levels of educational adequacy are difficult to
assess with regard to Northeast Brazil today.

Brazil is

ranked 114 out of 131 in "educational expenditures" by the
World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators,*^ with a
per capita annual expenditure of $4.63 US(as opposed to
$188.55 in the U.S.).*^

But this does not reveal the full

impact of the problem in the Northeast.

As with other im

portant areas of development, educational advances have
been highly uneven, with large regional disparities.
The availability and quality of schools differed
sharply between the urban and rural areas and among
the geographic regions of the country. Availablitiy
of schooling was much greater in urban than in rural
areas, and education above the elementary level was
found almost exclusively in cities and towns. By
regions, the school populations at all levels in the
South were at least twice the size of those in the
Northeast. 1-8
Demographic Dimensions.

Ramifications of the Brazilian

population explosion in the Northeast may have especially
damaging effects on development efforts in that region.

A net population increase of two million people per year
in Brazil

19

is evident in the Northeast, although exact

figures are not available.

It is certain, however, that

virtually any population increase in the region taxes the
limited food supply.

Nevertheless, population control is

a highly political question in Latin America, and some au
thors cite population growth as a necessary corelative to
political and socio-economic development.20

Furthermore,

high death rates and low life expectancy, particularly in
the Northeast, create an artificial need for increased
birth rates.

Life expectancy for Brazil was 60.7 years

(from birth) in 1970, but was AO years for the largely
rural regions of the North, Northeast, and West.

21

These

figures do not underscore the full impact of the urbanrural split with regard to mortality rates.

The rural

sector is likewise afflicted by intense periodic migration
of an immense scope.

While no figures with regard to the

Northeast are available, it is possible to locate figures
regarding the migrants from the Northeast.
Flight from the drought-striken localities has for
a century been a movement out of the intermittently
parched Northeast region....During the 1960s an esti
mated 200,000 have left this area annually for the
cities of the East and South and the farms of the Oentral-West and virgin parts of the Amazon basin. A 1967
survey showed that nearly AO percent of the migrants to
urban Brasilia and to the rural localities surrounding
it had coma from the Northeast. Until the 1870s half
of the country's population lived in the Northeast re
gion, but the exodus from the region during the sub
sequent years had resulted by 1968 in a relative re
duction in population.to an estimated 20 percent of
the country's total. 22

7
Thus, while the Northeast population has probably made
only slight net gains, and has declined relative to other
regions, a high birth rate has nevertheless had a per
nicious effect on development efforts.

The basic reason

for this is outlined by Edward Williams and Freeman Wright,
They note with regard to development in Latin America in
general that a pronounced birth rate in the poorest sector,
accompanied by high mortality rates, has produced "a very
young population whose consumption far exceeds its contri
bution to the development process,
Contemporary Trends,

Recent development efforts in the

Northeast have met with little success? the plight of the
nordeatinos remains essentially unchanged.

Evidence of

the great unevenness of Brazilian economic development is
especially apparent with regards to disparity between re
gions, a conditionsthat has only recenty been mitigated
to a small extent.
The Northeast states and most the other poorer states
improved their relative income shares from 1964through 1967, the latest date for which national in
come data are available. The Northeadt region did in
crease its share of total national income, but even
with the continued exodus of population from the' re
gion— although at lower rates than during the 1950s—
the average per capita income of the region rose only
moderately.. In 1967# the average income per capita
of that region remained about half of the national av
erage, only a fifth of the city of Rio de Janeiro,
Guanabara, and a quarter of the state of Sao Paulo. 4
But again, the figures mask the condition of the rural
nordestino during times of drought.

Foreman emphasizes

that suffering in the Northeast "is a national dis
grace, intricately tied to the periodic successes of the
various export crops that have dominated all of the re
gional and national economies of Brazil for most of its
history and also to the more recent growth of cities and
industry,...
Explanations of the Poverty.

The simplest of searches

through the literature and records of Northeast Brazil
soon becomes a tour of human misery and suffering.

The

problems of the region are intense, the landscape severe,
and the achievements of human struggle are often rendered
meaningless.

Drought, poverty, and forced migration are

conditions that reinforce each other and tend to form a
self-perpetuating cycle, one that appears at a cursory
glance to be unbreakable.
If severity is an important component of beauty,
then it is not surprising why so much of the literature
that has emerged from the Northeast has unique and aes
thetically engrossing qualities.

Nordestinos like Gra-

ciliano Ramos, Jose Lins do Rego, and Jorge Amado have
produced some of Brazil's finest fiction, and have been
widely translated.

One of the greatest accounts of the

Northeast is not fictional, however.

Euclides da Cunha,

in his epic Os Sertoes, was able to convey the severity
of the Northeast, and of the seca, or periodic drought.

It was early summer, and the backlands were begin
ning to take on the melancholy aspect of a desert.
The sun-soaked trees were withering and were shed
ding their leaves and flowers from day to days and
covering the ground was the dark-grey stubble of the
parched weeds, revealing the latent presence of the
drought with its unseen conflagration. The crude
bright light of the warm day was dazzling and implac
able against a sky that showed no appreciable change
from dawn to dusk. Day would break in a golden morn
ing and, after having scorched the earth for hours,
would at once be extinguished in night.
The Northeast can be divided geographically into
three zones*

the litoral, or tropical coastal zone, where

high rainfall produces a tropical rain forest climate suit
able for the production of sugar; the zona agreste, or for
ested zone, which borders on the litoral, is slightly high
er in elevation and less humid, and likewise figures in the
production of sugar as well as fruits and vegetables in
subsistence farming conditions; and the sertao. or inland
plateau, a huge polygonal area with savannah climate with
regular drought cycles where cattle production, when it is
possible, is the primary mode of subsistence.

When it is

not possible, when the summer thundershowers do not arrive
and the landscape is transformed into desert, then the sertane.jos become flagelados, beaten ones, tormented by their
land and driven from it.

These disastrous droughts have

been recorded at regular intervals since the beginning of
Portuguese settlement in the sertffo. as Charles Wagley
noted in An Introduction to Brazil.
Droughts are recorded as far back as 1710-1711, and
every eight to fifteen years thereafter until the

10

present. During the drought of 1877-1879, the entire
sertao was burned black by the sun, the cattle died,
and there were no crops. On writer estimated that al
most 500,000 people had died from starvation or from
diseases connected with starvation during this single
drought period.2?
The seca comprises only one dimension of the prob
lem of human poverty and privation, however.

The following

pages of this chapter will explore the human, geographic,
political, and environmental dimensions of this unfortunate
region of Brazil, as seen through the eyes of some of its
most celebrated writers and foreign observers.
Tendencies Toward Single-Cause Explanation.

The search for

a central factor responsible for the peverty and privation
in Northeast Brazil is an enterprise that is, in many sen
ses, predisposed to failure; this becomes evident in a brief
glance at the literature of the region.

A wide spectrum

of excuses for the disparity between the regions of the
Northeast and the South has been proffered; a vague sort of
agreement is possible only in the notion that the entire
Northeast is certainly beset with a potpourri of chronic
and acute disaster.
It is difficult even in a paper as cursory and periph
eral as is this one to refrain from elaborating on the vast
consequences of the seca.

Drought is an occurrence that

lends itself well to the imagry of single-cause explanation.
Euclides da Cunha is perhaps most responsible for the my
opia which surrounds and pervades the regional problems.

11

As a journalist who accompanied the Brazilian mil
itary response to an uprising by fanatic sertane.ios in 1897f
da Cunha was able to observe and describe a region that had
gone unrecorded in Brazilian literature.

Rather than lim

iting his scientific and lyrical description to the im
mediate area of conflict, da Cunha devoted considerable en
ergy and care in presenting a background of the entire
Northeast region, producing at one juncture what has been
described as "the sixty-one finest pages ever written in
the Qportuguesel language,"^®

Da Cunha's primary focus

was on the struggle for survival in the sertao during the
drought, and this has probably contributed to a great de
gree in establishing the stereotype of the region*

that

the immense poverty and privation of the region are neces
sarily and inextricably linked to natural disaster.
As a positivist scholar, da Cunha tended to empha
size "natural" causal relationships, and to minimize or ig
nore social inequities.

He regarded the racially-mixed

sertanejo from an ambivolent standpoint.

He described the

resident of the sertao as both mentally inferior and par
ticularly well adapted to the suffering of a harsh climate.
But there was more to da Cunha*s view.

When Brazilian t

troops attacked(and were initially repulsed by) the follow
ers of the religious fanatic Antonio Conselheiro,

da Cunha

wrote that "it was the very core of our nationality, the
bedrock of our race, which troops were attacking here...."

12

A subsequent qualification of this remark argued that his
comments had been critical of that "bedrock", but the
impression remains that da Cunha ultimately admired and
identified with the people from the sertao.

The Natural Disaster Explanation.

The quality of life for

■the sertane.jo, as da Cunha repeatedly explains, is en
tirely dependent upon the arrival of the rains.

If by .

March there is no trace of the trovoada, or thundershower,
then a general anxiety begins to afflict the backcountry.
Pood supplies, already low, are more strenuously rationed,
and fears of the worst predominate.

In that da Cunha em-

hasized the natural dimension of human suffering in the
Northeast in his classic work, he has become closely
identified with the self interests in the region.

These

interests have traditionally found it expedient to explain
the preponderance of poverty and human privation as inev
itable products of the climate.

Although da Cunha had no

such regional interests, and in fact never intended his
work to be viewed as a treatise on poverty and privation,
its eloquence and meticulous attention make it an ex
cellent introduction to the literature surrounding this
explanation.
The "natural" explanation of conditions in the
Northeast has always appealed to Brazilian governments
in that it tends, at the very worst, to support its in

13
clination to dismiss the problem of responsibility, and
at best, to underscore the great number of important and
promising public works in effect or in the offing.

The

1937 publication by the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs entitled Brazil?

Statistics, Resources and

Possibilities, for example, emphasized the persistence
of natural disasters in the region.
ed

Its section entitl

"North Eastern Brazil" began?
The north east of Brazil comprises the vast region of
the States of Piauhy, Ceara, Rio Grande do Norte, Parahyba, Pernambuco, Alagoas, Sergipe, and Bahia. A
series of phenomena of various kinds, act in a decis
ive manner upon the economy of this part of Brazil,
resulting in periods of great abundance interspersed
with complete stoppage of production, causing veritable
calamities. The chif cause of this serious detriment
to local economy is attributed to bad rain distribu
tion and to the impermeability of the ground, which
does not possess the necessary properties for the ab- ;
sorbtion of pluviometrical precipitation. The Bra
zilian Government has never neglected a national
problem of such great importance, maintaining a de
partment designed exclusively for the study and car
rying out of this type of work— the "Federal Inspec
tion Department of Works Against the D r o u g h t " . 3°

The chapter subsequently listed all of the plafcs and pri
orities of the department in glowing terms, and included
a list of about fifty recent accomplishments— dams, wells
and irrigation systems.

Nevertheless, Vera Kelsey, in her

book Seven Keys to Brazil, observed that just two years
later, in 1939, 90,000 refugees of the seca made the
long trek to Sao Paulo, and many more flooded into the
31
capital cities of the Northeast.
Da Cunha's veracity is by no means compromised by

14

his almost impulsive fascination with the seca.

From the

context of the observer, especially one who views the im
mediacy of this phenomenon, the socio-political bases of
the resultant human suffering are perhaps less evident—
and are certainly less conducive to poetry— than is this
harsh blast of prolonged summer.

Furthermore, it was the

appeal of the poetry which first called to the popular
attention the serious conditions in the Northeast.
Anyone who, in the heat of the summer, ventures to
cross the northern backlands, becomes accustomed to
unusual scenes. Particularly as the cycle of the
drought comes on, with its alternation of burninghot days and all but frigid nights, the earth appears
to strip itself of all humanity, with all life latent,
merely immobilizing without decomposing the beings
that live upon it. It thereby realizes to a high de
gree the physiological possibility of a virtual ex
istence where no life seems to be, with all energies
pent up, lulled to sleep simply, and ready to break
out again of a sudden when favorable conditions re
turn, giving rise to unforseen and amazing resurrec
tions.^
It may well be that it is the intensity of the seca which
alters the focus of observers.

Even Josue de Castro,

whose work Death in the Northeast

concentrates on the

political and socio-economic inequities of the region,
can be said to be swept away in a prosaic and lyrical
vein when he describes the drought in similes and person
ifications .
...no land gives a stronger impression of suffering
than the sertao, with its skin baked and corroded by
the rigors of the climate. The sandstone cover is so
heavily eroded and denuded that in places crystalline
rock shows through the granitic surface, and the soil
is a thin and meager layer, with outcroppings of jag
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ged rock protruding like bare bones. There is a
deep poignancy, an air of desolute suffering, in this
wounded land, its sides riven by f l a s h f l o o d s . 33
William L. Schurz, in his work Brazil, the Infi
nite Country, has provided a description of the region
which is perhaps typical of most accounts.

After noting

that it is "cursed by droughts,” and that these secas
bring with them times "of tragedy that may be prolonged
for a year or m o r e , "3^ he briefly observes that chronic
human conditions lend themselves to the suffering that
accompanies the droughts.

Gross underproductivity of

vital food supplies within the region is underscored
during droughts such as the very serious one of 1958*
It has been calculated that the beef supply available
to the population declined by 300,000 metric tons,
and the stock of basic foodstuff by a total of 700,000
tons. The yield of corn and beans fell to fifteen per
cent of normal, and the yield of manioc and bananas,
the other staples in the subsistence diet of the
sertao, was cut by h a l f . 35
Schurz's recognition of the social character of the prob
lem of human suffering in the Northeast is typically sim
plistic— he confuses the "inconquerable natural disaster"
thesis with the persistence of social patterns that dic
tate that suffering of vast magnitude will continue to
occur.

Schurz myopically reports that the social charac

ter of the problem consists of "the singular and persis
tent attachment of the sertane.jo to his inhospitable
home.

"35

Thus, what might be considered from another per

spective as the primary hope that the problems will one
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day be resolved, is in this typical representation dis
missed as a source of the problems.
The seca of Northeast Brazil, then, has become an
almost exclusive explanation of the political and socio
economic problems of the region.

This was especially

true in da Cunha's age, when the best of military prep
arations seemed grossly insufficient for coping with the
drought, and a well equipped expeditionary force faced
37
an almost impossible task in crossing the sertlTo in summer.
Despite his careful attention to detail, da Cunha propa
gated a serious misconception concerning Northeast Brazil*
not every nordestino lives in the sertao, and even in that
zone, much of the hunger is both chronic and perpetual.

Critics of the Natural Disaster Explanation.

In his book

Diagnosis of the Brazilian Crisis, economist Celso Furtado
describes the major proponents of the "natural disaster"
theory of human suffering in the Northeast, and explains
the generally fallacious and self-interested bases of
their arguments.
As numerous sections of the Northeastern ruling clas
ses for a long time lived on federal government funds
administered in an equivocal manner, a peculiar sit
uation was created in which those groups interested
in maintaining the status quo are the same ones who
most dramatize the region's problems and cry out for
the need for change. However, we are dealing with a
dramatization based on false problems that deflects
attention from the real ones. For this reason, the
"droughts" have been made into the great enemy to be
contended with, responsible for all the ills that
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torment the Northeasterner.
Furtado analyzes the extent to which the "drought explan
ation" has harmed efforts to alleviate suffering in the
Northeast.
The irresponsibility of those who exploited the
drought harmed the Northeast in two wayst on the
one hand it created a false image of the problems
of that region, whose real possibilities for de
velopment began to be underestimated, with talk of
the inevitability of its progressive abandonmenti
on the other, it justified in the minds of the ma
jority of the country’s rulers their neglect of the
problems of the Northeast, a region to which "there
was no point in sending money," since the money would
in any case always be misused. To put right the false
image, and to give an accurate picture of the complex
reality of the region, is the first requirement for
an understanding of the problem of the Northeast.
Since this book was published, identification and recog
nition of the complexity of the problems of the North
east have been undertaken from a variety of perspectives.
Miguel Arraes, former governor of the state of
Pernambuco and radical critic of the present regime in
Brazil, is firm in his political analysis of the basic
problem.
[The present Brazilian governmentJ is quite unable
to do anything at all to alter the present system of
land ownership and to improve the lot of the mass of
poor peasants and agricultural wage-earners.^®
Arraes argues that the penetration of foreign capital into
all levels of Brazilian industry has created a one-sided
trade relationship in which Brazil receives far less than
it contributes.

Furthermore, the nature of this situation
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is such that the government becomes progressively depen
dent upon it.

His observation is corroborated by numer

ous other analysts of Brazilian political and socio-econ
omic development.
Josue^de Castro expresses a viewpoint which is
equidistant between blaming and disclaiming the seca as
the major problem of the Northeast.

Although much of his

book Death in the Northeast concerns the political dimen
sions of hunger in that region, de Castro is a native
Nordestino, and has a great awe and respect for the im
mense physical and psychological impact of drought.

But

his primary point is that drought must be put in a per*-:,
spective that is relative to social and political fac
tors.
The drought is a secondary, a subsidiary cause, which
merely aggravates an existing state of affairs deter
mined by.other causes, that are social rather than
natural./*1
The s£ca, for all its intensity, is no enemy of the
caatinga, or the sparse, thorny vegetation of the sertao.
As Celso Furtado noted, "the Caatinga is designed to re
sist drought, even if it lasts as long as two or three
It O

years, which sometimes happens.**

The seca can be seen

from this context not as a natural disaster, but rather
as a natural and recurrent phenomenon.

The social re

action to this phenomenon, starvation and forced migra
tion, have little meaning without the prolonged social
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acceptance of these conditions.
A long-term economic relationship has been observ
ed between the populations of the different climaetic
zones of the Northeast which is based in large measure on
the continued dependency of the people of the sertaoj this
is perhaps a crucial first step evaluating the social and
political dimensions of poverty in the region.

The fact

that areas of high labor-intensive industry are periodi
cally glutted with desparate and capable workers— as the
sertanejos have established themselves— is of critical
importance.

One historian who hints at this thesis is

Charles Wagley.

In An Introduction to Brazil. Wagley

if*

notes the complementary dependency between labor from
"tlle sertao and producers of sugar and cacao in its border
regi ons.
Every year considerable numbers of sertane.jos, as the
inhabitants of the interior are called, leave their
homes and participate in the sugarcane and cacao har
vests of the coastal region. The economic viability
of these crops has become completely dependent on this
influx of sertane.jo labor for short periods during the
year. ^
The tendency of economic dependency to perpetuate itself
creates conditions that persist long after the rains have
returned.

Sugar and Cattle.

A recent article in a small English-

language newspaper that specializes in Latin America noted
that "Brazil may now be the World’s top sugar producer.

Its harvest is expected to be almost 7 million metric
tons this year...."^

The recent growth of the Brazilian

sugar industry underscores the cyclical patterns of "boom
and bust" which has plagued the Brazilian economy since
the seventeenth century.

Sugar production in Northeast

Brazil was responsible for such a pattern of rapid growth
followed by massive collapsej furthermore, many observers
have noted that it was the cultivation of sugar cane in
the Northeast which was responsible for propagating re
gressive and anti-democratic social strata.
Furtado observed that the establishment of a
sugar industry in the litoral, and of cattle production
in the sertao, in the sixteenth and seventeenth cen
turies gave rise to many of the problems of the twen
tieth century.
The characteristics acquired by the two economic sys
tems in the Northeast— the sugar industry and stock
breeding— during the slow process of decline, begin
ning in the latter half of the seventeenth century,
were basic factors in the formation of what was to
become.the Brazilian economy of the twentieth cen
tury.
The technical description that follows in Furtado*s analy
sis emphasizes a pathology of development in Northeast
Brazil that has persisted since colonial days.

Its

primary characteristic is a complete lack of socio-econ

omic planning.

In this environment, the sugar and cattle

industries spread beyond their viable limits, encompassing
and often suffocating vital and irreplacable segments of
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the economy*
While Furtado emphasized the economic liabilities
of the sugar and cattle industries in Northeast Brazil,
Gilberto Freyre, a well-known Brazilian sociologist, has
stressed the social problems that resulted from their ex
clusive development.

In a key paragraph of his book

Casa Grande e Senzala, he observed that
Sugar raising not only stifled the democratic indus
tries represented by the trade in brazilwood and
hides,* it sterilized the land for the forces; of di
versified farming and herding for a broad expanse
around the plantations. It called for an enormous
number of slaves. Cattle-raising, meanwhile, with
the possibilities it afforded for a democratic way of
life, was relegated to the backlands. ^7
The backlands, it would be discovered, could not adequate
ly support the cattle industry, although a negative con
dition of dependence uppn it soon developed.

Conditions

were established which led to the entrenchment of sterile
and non-viable monocultures.
Caio Prado, in The Colonial Background of Modern
Brazil, further underscores the poverty of the cattle in
dustry in the sertao.

Much like the sugar industry, its

environment seemed to dictate the outcome.
The Sertao offered
tle, hardly enough
to avoid producing
that furnished the
colony.^8

Social Consequences.

only miserable subsistence for cat
to survive * and it was, impossible
the scrawny and muscular bullocks
unappetizing meat eaten in the

The thesis in Prado's work, much
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like that found in Freyre*s, is that the colonization
process provided for future development, and established
firm patterns, in the Northeast.

Prado described these

patterns as "'forces' whose most external significant
manifestation was the anxiety...permeating all classes
49
and groups of society...."
Prado continued*
Another essential outcome of the colonization process...
must be singled out. This was the growing number of
people condemned to a marginal existence outside the
normal productive activity of colonization. This ac
tivity was almost exclusively limited ro members of
the closed circle of the colony's basic economic and
social organization* masters and slaves, the entre
preneurs and administrators of colonization and their
humble tools. As long as there were only masters and
slaves, as at the very beginning, everything went
well. 50
Abolition of slavery in 1889 accelerated the creation of
a large marginal class, according to Gaio Prado, which
persists into the present.
Freyre indicts the colonial process for establish
ing social patterns which contribute to the poverty of
the modern Northeast.

Furthermore, he observes that the

conditions of human poverty tend to some extent to be s^lfperpetuating.

Poor-nutrition is an important example of

a condition which, according to Freyre, provides for a
social structure based upon consequent physiological weak
nesses,

After suggesting that nutritional deficiencies

can be responsible for debilitation of mental capacities,
he notes that*
Prominent among the effects of hyponutrition are*
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a decrease in stature, weight, and chest measurement;
deformities of the bony structure; decalcification of
the teeth; thyroid insufficiency, pituitary and gonadinal, leading to premature old age, a generally impov
erished fertility, apathy....5*
Freyre emphasizes a sort of fatalistic determinism based
upon these colonial patterns— he denies in many respects
the capacity of the people and society of the Northeast
to change.

To this extent, his account of the nordestino

is closely related to the "natural" explanation of poverty
and privation in that region.
In the final analysis, the problems of poverty
and privation in Northeast Brazil must be reduced to

,

basic constituents, including widespread lack of food,
shelter, and medical services.

De Castro concludes*

What causes so much dying in the Northeast? People
die of everything, of course, but mainly they die of
hunger-— hunger in multiple disguises is the most ac
tive of the four horsemen. Hunger kills as a disease—
the most serious and generalized of the mass diseases
of the underdeveloped regions— and also by making way
for other sicknesses.

Political Ramifications
Fear Tactics and Results.

A complex body of writings has

emerged since 1962 that deals with the socio-economic pre
requisites of change in Northeast Brazil.

While some of

the writers in this field have proposed solutions that
appear to be grounded in "objective" principles of social
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science* others have engaged in exercises that are closer
akin to blatent political opportunism.

The ramifications

of "scare tactics" in the Northeast are extensive.

Indeed^

such tactics may have constituted the primary motivation
for a number of programs, including the Alliance for Pro
gress, a U.S. sponsored aid program that became noteworthy
during its ten years of existence for its lack of both
alliance and progress.
World-wide attention was drawn to the Northeast
in I960 primarily because of newspaper coverage of the
traditional problems of drought and consequent political
unrest in that region.

Two articles appeared in the New

York Times, for example, which emphasized a correlation
between the Northeast and Cuba, a recent debacle from the
standpoint of many U.S. policy-makers.

Tad Sculc noted

in one of these articles, published on October 31* i960,
that an environment conducive to revolution existed in
Northeast Brazil, and that this condition was becoming
53
manifested in "peasant leagues?,’ a nomenclature that
suggested the Chinese agrarian revolution.

In a second

article, Szulc helpfully added that'”’Recife is the support
base for the southern string of tracking stations of the
South Atlantic guided missile range of the United States
Air Force."

54

His point was emphasized by the title of the

article, "Marxists Organizing Peasants in Brazil."

The

attention of President-elect Kennedy was drawn by this
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focus, and the Alliance for Progress, a product of the
new Kennedy administration, was designed in part to
respond to the conditions in the largest concentrated
poverty area of the western hemisphere, the Brazilian
Northeast,
Of key importance in the subsequent history of
the Northeast was the simultaneous formation by the
Brazilian government of a new economic planning agency
under the guidance and leadership of Furtado.

The

Superintendencia de Desenvolvimento do Nordeste, or
SUDENE, was initially charged with coordinating a re
novation of:political, economic and social institutions
in the Northeast which actively contributed to the
status quo, a task of overwhelming proportions.
Riordan Roett has described the relationship that devel
oped between the Alliance and the SUDENE in The Politics
of Foreign Aid.

He noted that hostility and fear on the

part of U.S. functionaries in the Alliance program were
important factors in the eventual breakdown of the rela
tionship.

Of likewise importance was the scope of the

task that both agencies confronted.
The problems that hampered
came in large measure from
cal institutions of Brazil
tion in the rate of social

the Alliance and the SUDENE
the inability of the politi
to cope with an accelera
and economic change.55

The Alliance was confronted with ambiguous goals of poli
tical and military security on the one hand, and radical
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economic and social change on the other.

It should not

be surprising, in view of this ambiguity, that the Alli
ance for Progress left the Northeast in 1971 in essential
ly the same condition in which it had found it.
Although aware of the modernization potential of for
eign aid, the Kennedy administration and its successor
failed to use assistance funds to support those groups
committed to realistic societal changei indirectly,
the emergency aid policies of the United States worked
to prolong the influence of the traditional social and
economic groups. The United States in the 1960s found
itself in the awkward position of advocating political
and social modernization in underdeveloped nations
while possessing and using foreign aid as an instru
ment to impede modernization in the name of national
and international security.56
According Roett, the administrators of the U.S, program
were incapable of recognizing the primary constituents of
the problem of poverty in the Northeast.

Furthermore,

U.S. officials came to disapprove of the structure of the
SUDENE, and opted to support only one of its goals— that
of regional industrialization.

The long-range result of

this policy has been the importation into the Northeast
of highly subsidized, and often fully automated, factor
ies that tend to mass produce articles from southern
Brazilian resources, and then transport those articles
back to the South.

Miguel Arraes, in his book Brazil>

The Power and the People, presented one interpretation of
the U.S. policy of stimulating industrialization.
The policy of industrialization at any price and
through free enterprise amounts actually to a de
fense of free penetration by foreign companies.
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But in the final analysis, American advisors based their
decisions on feari
"another Cuba".

fear that the Northeast would become

Furthermore, they.sensed a close con

nection between economic conditions and political sta
bility that may well have less significance in the
Brazilian setting.

As Peter Ranis observed,

Brazilians have long taken sustenance from a nonideological view of political life which has per
mitted them to "muddle through" difficulties by
compromise solutions. They have elevated prag
matism to a social art, and this has often saved
the Brazilian nation from bloody revolutions^
political violence, and military fratricide.**3
To American and European journalists, the emergence of
familiar political patterns overshadowed the lessons of
the Brazilian past, and may well have contributed to an
erroneous assessment of the situation in the Northeast.
Conclusion.

The literature of the Northeast indicates

that regional problems are not simple, and that political
change in that region, barring unforseen and drastic de
velopments, is relatively unlikely.

The Northeast is of

ten romanticized, but rarely is it viewed as a land of
plenty.

It is a center of human suffering, and this,

perhaps more than any other, is the theme of the liter
ature of the Northeast.
Solutions to the regional problems will depend
upon the recognition and dynamic treatment of a variety
of obstacles.

Many critics agree that one of these is
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a general Brazilian reluctance to accept political
change.

The inability of Brazil, whose southern states

are wealthy in the context of Latin America, to recognize
the plight of the Northeast as a national problem is
crucial in this regard.

The national tendency to re

gard the Northeast as a wasteland, to recognize only
the stereotype of the sertao. is likewise regressive.
De Castro emphasizes that drought is not the focal
point of poverty in this region.
...in reality not all of the Northeast is dry, and
drought is by no means the basic cause of all calam
ity, even in the deep sertffo.59
De Castro is not denying the existence and recurrence of
severe drought— he is merely contradicting those who main
tain that physical solutions such as dams, irrigation
projects and wells will solve the problems of poverty
in the region.

The starting point in overcoming these

problems, he contends, is located within those political
and economic institutions which actively resist change.
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CHAPTER I I

NATIONALISM, POLITICAL AGITATION, AND
THE GENESIS OF THE SUDENE
An Institutional Response.

It cannot be denied that North

east Brazil has problems of the scope and intensity to
challenge even the most comprehensive program of economic
development.

Roett has written thati

The Northeast is an area of extreme underdevelopment.
Economic and social indicators place the area in the
same category with underdeveloped zones of Asia and
Africas high illiteracy, malnutrition, inadequate ed
ucation and housing, and an antiquated agrarian es
tablishment that remains immune to change.
The task of this paper is to outline the political bases
of this "underdevelopment" and to take issue with the ageold argument that the drought of the Northeast is an inconquerable force that mandates the regional condition of
poverty.

One of de Castro's primary points in Death in

the Northeast is that traditional landed interests of the
region actively and consistently resist political and econ
omic change, and are, in this sense, directly responsible
J

for the patterns that have persisted.

Brazilian institutions experienced a rapid growth
period between 1952 and 196A, and it was during this time
33

3*

that the Brazilian government created another agency in
the Northeast to deal with the problems of poverty and
privation in that region.

It was called the Superinten-

dencia de Desenvolvimento do Nordeste(the Northeast De
velopment Superintendency)» or the SUDENE.

Celso

Furtado, a widely-known Brazilian economist, was appointed
its first director.

Roett described the SUDENE plan

which had come into being by I960.
The SUDENE was a federal agencyand, as such,
it had
a potential capacity to rival the political oligarchy
of the area through the creation of a new, reformist
coalition and by possessing a comprehensive develop
ment program that was not dependent on the region for
financial support.3
Although extreme conditions of poverty existed in the
Brazilian rural sector in general, the government chose
to concentrate on the most egregious

example, and to opt

for a regional "experimental" plan.

By appointing a

Northeastern economist to head the agency, it was as
sumed that regional sentiments would
the tasks ahead.

lend themselves to

Such a regionalist sentiment, in fact,

was probably essential for even a modicum of success,
given the broad and ill-defined goals of the institution.
The validity of the regional approach became the
crucial question.

By late 1963« Furtado was simultaneous

ly the superintendent of the SUDENE and the chief archi
tect responsible for writing a five-year economic devel
opment plan for the nation.

While he spoke in favor of
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a national plan of development, Furtado's primary con
cern was with regional programs.

He wrote about this

critical period prior to 1964 in a book published in
1965 in which he mentioned that although an independent
national electorate was becoming more and more evident,
the legislature nevertheless retained its traditional
structuret

a composite of conservative and regional

interests that constantly engaged in impasse with the
executive branch,^

Regional solutions, though gener

ally inadequate in the long-run, were the only politically
feasible solutions in that political milieu.
The emphasis of the SUDENE upon development in
the rural sector, furthermore, was probably its strongest
point,

Guy Hunter noted in Modernizing Peasant Societies

that "the strategy of rural development is...a part of
the total strategy by which the political aims of a so
ciety are to be achieved...."^

A*a populous region com

prised primarily of what might be called a "peasant" pop
ulation, the Northeast held the key to development in
the nation— especially its rural sector.

By the same

token, the fact that the SUDENE failed first, and most
dramatically in the rural Northeast meant that it
could not provide for the conditions that appear to have
been essential for significant political and economic
change in the Northeast,
By i960, Furtado and his staff of young bureau-
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crats realized that the processes of political and socio
economic development in the region would require large
pools of resources and exceptional, at least in the con
text of Brazilian politics, political considerations.
This was especially true with regards to the political
dimensions of "modernization", and the problem of author
ity.

David Apter, in discussing the generalities of

the "modernization" process, notes thati
Modernization may be described in non-industrial so
cieties as the transposition of certain roles— profes
sional, technical, administrative— and the transposi
tion of institutions supporting these roles— hospitals,
schools, universities, bureaucracies. Non-industrial
modernizing societies, however, lack the powerful inte
grating thrust found in industrial societies. Social
organizations are more chaotic and confused.
Politics
becomes the mechanism of integration, and authority is
the critical problem confronting the leader.
Furtado immediately confronted this authority crisis in
Northeast Brazil by establishing a political base of
authority.

Such support was necessary in order to

accomplish even minimal goals.

Stefan Robock, of the

Brookings Institution, identified Furtado's political
support in a report on Northeast Brazil published in
1963.
Although President Janio Quadros gave Celso
Furtado cabinet member status, neither Quadros
nor his successor, Joao Goulart, exerted strong
political leadership to have Congress approve the
Northeast plan. To win the political battle, Fur
tado and his dedicated associates developed five
main sources of political strengthj the state
governors in the Northeast, federal legislators
from the South, university student groups, Bra
zilian nationalists, and the United States for
eign aid program.?
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The authority crisis that later beset the SUDENE can be
traced to the erosion of these bases of support.

Further

more, as these bases began to erode, Furtado was forced
to devote more of his time to political, rather than tech
nical, activities.

His priorities therefore suffered a

simultaneous and related erosion.
A strong indication of the degree to which Fur
tado was victimized by politics— in the banal sense of
the word— is suggested by the aftermath of the Brazilian
military coup of 1964,

Widely known as a technician and

a scholar, Furtado was allowed to leave Brazil without
detainment during April of 1964.

Before the end of the

year, however, conservative interests had convinced the
military to issue a warrant for his arrest as a sub
versive.

Although Furtado considers himself to be a

leftist, his plans for the Northeast emphasized indus- '
trialization based on private investment.

Furthermore,

he consistently alienated communists and socialists
with such programs as tax breaks for corporations willing
to expand into the Northeast, and at one juncture earned
their armed animosity.
In late February, 1964, a labor organization dominated
by the communists transported armed peasants by truck
to Recife and had them surround the SUDENE building in
a bid to prevent a meeting which was going to discuss
whether to allow foreign companies to take advantage
of the tax incentives. The peasants carried signs de
nouncing "imperialism" and defending "basic reforms."
According to one of the local newspapers, the police _
stayed away and let the demonstration run its course.
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In retrospect, efforts by the SUDENE to effect
political change in Northeast Brazil alienated virtually
all of the traditional and popular political interests.
The exigencies of political development meant that a
wide spectrum of solutions had to be experimented with,
and although many of these were soon rejected, the pub
licity that resulted remained behind as a pernicious
force.

As Robock noted in 1963. "the SUDENE movement was

destined to evoke the maximum of political resistance.
Of central importance in the wide spectrum of
resistence experienced by the SUDENE after 1961 was the
presence of growing nationalism in Brazil.

Furthermore,

the military coup of 1964, and the dozen years of military
dictatorship that have followed it, have not significantly
altered many of the basic patterns that are associated
with the growth of national industrial potential in
developing nations.

Thus, in some key respects, events

since 1964 have accentuated political change in the North
east, although it has been a change that is without plan
or order.

Ironically, it has been the traditional landed

interests that have suffered the most significant loss
of influence.
The extension of government controls over municipal
offices and expenditures after 1964 has substantially
reduced the store of patronage that for the better
part of this century allowed rural elites to compete
for a following, thereby impairing the patron’s abil
ity to meet his former dependents' new demands. At
the same time, newspapers, radio broadcasts, in some
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cases television, and the actual presence of urban
organizers bring alternative messages into the coun
tryside, thus broadening the peasants' horizons and
further circumscribing the patron's sphere of influ
ence.
The movement of nationalism into the Northeast was perhaps
the critical condition with regards to the success of the
SUDENE, and those development efforts that have followed
it.

The insensitivity of the directors of the SUDENE to

this factor was of great importance to the efficacy of
the programs.

In a sense, the widespread resistance to

the SUDENE represented two extremes in coalition*

the

nationalist sentiment, rejecting one more regional solu
tion for the Northeast; and the regional oligarchical in
terests, attacking another national encroachment on their
influence.
Regionalism in a Nationalist Period.

Northeast regional

development plans, in general, have quickly regressed in
to colossal tragicomedies, especially in view of the grav
ity of the problems that they have sought to overcome.
Their consistent inability to mitigate the persistent con
ditions of poverty and privation in the region suggests
some obvious shortcoming.

Their approaches have followed

a variety of forms, but perhaps the one common thread
among them is their regional focus.

It should be noted

at this juncture that conditions of human poverty and
privation exist throughout the rural sector of Brazil.
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The national dimensions of the problem suggests the
inherent weaknesses that are invariably part of region
al programs like the SUDENE.

If only the problem of

periodic mass migration is considered* it is apparent that
conditions in one geographical area of the rural sector
are incapable of significant development relative to other
rural areas.
A primary consideration of the politics of Brazil
is the extent to which they are, in fact, closely tied to
federalism.

An example of this is the DNOCS, or the

National Department of Works Against the Drought, which
has sought for many years to overcome the physical prop
erties of drought through dams, wells, irrigation projects,
and crop rotation in the Northeast.

Established in the

1890's, it has remained virtually oblivious to the human
problems of the Northeast while concentrating on a limited
and mutually beneficial relationship with the region's
elite.

At the same time, on a federal level, it has

effectively placated or rebutted many of the complaints
lodged in the federal congress concerning living conditions
in the rural sector.
Regional concessions to parochial power structures
have long been the norm of Brazilian politics, and the
result has been the growth of powerful regional oli
garchies.

This pattern, which was initiated as early as

the colonial period, was fostered during the empire, and
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emerged repeatedly since then in periodic spurts.

The

first of these occurred shortly after the formation of
the First Republic in 1889.
The politics of the First Republic were characterized
by a limited franchise, the economic dominance of the
states of Minas Gerais and Sao Paulo, tacit support of
the armed forces, and a process of 'adjustment and com
promise among the oligarchies, a politica dos governadores(the politics of the governors), an understand
ing that the central government would not interfere
in the internal affairs of the states.**
In terms of the Northeast, this meant that the entrenched
conservative landowning class received renewed national
support.

Subsequent periods of stimulus to local oligar

chies preserved this class in power through the 1930s,
when:
urban centers remained largely extensions of an agrar
ian society. Newspapers reflected elite opinion. The
church co-operated with the oligarchy in guaranteeing
redemption only to those who realized that their role,. ?
in the political system was that of a non-participant.
Although examples exist of social unrest based on the con
ditions of the Northeast in the 1930s, most notably that
of the bandit Lampiao, a significant political ’awakening*
cannot be said to have occurred in the countryside.
The decade of the 19^0s, however, signaled the
arrival of a new set of circumstances.

Brazil, for a

variety of reasons, had entered into a new nationalist
phase which began to spread rapidly into the countryside.
Foreman explains:
Population shifts brought great pressures to bear not
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only in urban areas but also in the countryside.
Increased demands for agricultural produce and a
rationalization of the internal marketing system
contributed to a sudden valorization of agricul
tural land and the subsequent displacement of
masses of peasants. Rural-urban migration and
the remittance of new ideas contributed to the
making of a peasant consciousness or, at the very
least, to a recognition that their defined set of
needs could not be best expressed through "tradi
tional" channels.*3
The formation of a national peasant identity in the 1940s
and 1950s could be said to have followed general patterns
associated with growing nationalism.

Less related factors

that nevertheless contributed significantly to a new na
tional identity during this period included a world champ
ionship soccer team(1958) and the rapid proliferation of
battery-powered radios throughout the countryside.

But

one of the basic factors, the industrialization of the
South, insured that rapid communication technology would
find its way into even the most remote corner of the
sertao.

Furthermore, it created a lucrative and stable

job market in the South, one that would begin to attract
increasing numbers of nordestinos.

Furthermore, new

demand for agricultural products created intense strains
on the archaic methods of agriculture, and linked the
producers increasingly with the modern techniques and e
implements of the South.

Thus the new awareness and

subsequent pressures brought on by industrialization in
the South began to nationalize the rural sector, and
while many of the trappings of regional politics persisted,
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problems that could be more closely associated with
nationalism began to emerge more and more frequently.
National identity, and the problems of nationbuilding, comprise an important dimension in understand
ing why it was that the SUDENE was unable to bring about
significant political and economic development.

Williams

and Wright note that the development of a variety of con
ditions took place all over Latin America during this
period.

They included such elements as increased politi

cal power, the increased ability to carry out massive agrar
ian reforms, and the extensive growth of bureaucracies.
They describe tendencies toward nation-building in Latin
America after 1946 that seem to apply well to the case
of Brazil.
Practically every socio-economic and political policy
and program proposed and implemented since that time
has had nation-building implications.14
The implications of nationalism with regards to
the Brazilian peasantry are profound, and to some degree
manifestly permanent.

Political activities generally

associated with regionalism did receive support after
1946, and traditional oligarchical structures remained
relatively intact.

It might be said, in fact, that many

of the changes that took place in the political milieu
of the Northeast between 1946 and 1964 were excessively
vulnerable to the traditional political interests.

After

noting that few of the political institutions that grew

up in the nationalist period between 1946 and 1964
were able to survive into the 1970s, Foreman concludes
that:
The political movement of the 1950's and 1960's en
gaged a large number of peasants partially and fleetingly in the political process, but as an "external"
factor which could not be easily accommodated. In an
important sense, the extent of their participation
far outweighed its significance.*5
And so, on the one hand the nationalist period between
1946 and 1964 provided for a permanent and profound
politicization of the countryside, and on the other that
period left few formal structures which endured.
A second dimension of the confrontation between
nationalism and regionalism in the Northeast prior to 1964
is evident in the resistance that the SUDENE encountered
from traditional landed interests.

In contrast to the

conflict between the growing nationalism of the peasants
and the regional focus of the SUDENE, the traditional land
ed interests interpreted the SUDENE program as a direct
challenge to Northeastern regional autonomy.

They resist

ed that program in the one area where it was most vulner
able— the rural sector.
It was the traditional elite's continued influence
within official as well as private circles that thwart
ed the SUDENE efforts to change the agricultural life
of the Northeast. The agricultural reform objectives
remained statements of purpose and hope rather than
becoming programs.16
Whether or hot it was purposeful or tactical, the ability
of regional interests to withstand the SUDENE rural program

constituted a powerful blow to the success of the whole
program.

Based on pressure from the rural landowning

class, the SUDENE followed a course on non-agricultural
planning, and this inevitably turned in the direction
of industrialization, according to Roetto1-?
A clear example of the ability of rural landowners
to resist, the changes implicit in the SUDENE program is
evident in the sugar industry.

As the region's chief

cash crop, primary recipient of government subsidization,
and most dependent industry on a plentiful supply of lowwage labor, the uslneiros, or sugar producers, had long
been sensitive to their vulnerable position.

They had

long ago rationalized their position with the argument
that they provided the means of life to laborers who
would otherwise have starved.
The government kept the usineiros in business, enabl
ing them to keep their workersin a state of semi
starvation, and thus in readiness for the next crisis.
It was a vicious cycle, and its preservation was the
function of the Sugar and Alcohol Institute, a federal
agency created during the Great Depressions and as one
might expect, under the political control of the North,
eastern sugar industry. 8
The poverty of the workers, furthermore, was a critical
element in the government subsidization of the industry.
By maintaining living standards of the workers at a level
close to non-subsistence, they retained a powerful claim
on federal crop insurance.

According to Joe Page, "the

government had to keep the sugar industry of the Northeast
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afloat to prevent all these people from starving to
19
death."
The SUDENE plan to transform the Northeastern
peasants into literate and economically independent people
was logically seen by the sugar industry as a threat to
its survival, at least in its present form*
Development efforts in the Northeast since 1964
have tended to recognize the importance of national, or
at least supraregional, economic planning.

The Plan of

National Integration, or PIN, is probably the outstanding
example.
A dramatic national initiative to influence the
course of, development in the Northeast was announced
by the Medici government in June 1970....The integra
tion plan was to bring together two interests of the
Brazilian governments the integration and development
of the Amazon Basin and the resolution of outstanding
social and economic questions, in the Northeast.20
The main goal of the program was to "provide additional
infrastructure in the North and Northeast" through the
construction of a highway from Cuiaba to Santarem, and
"the irrigation of 135 million hectares in the Northeast
21
by 1974."
The. program, however, did not recognize the
political conditions in the Northeast, and especially the
traditional tendency of the large landowners to actively
and effectively resist socially relevant change.
The primary goals of the PIN sought to resolve
social problems in the Northeast by removing them physi
cally.
The emphasis on colonization and the absorption of ex-
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cess labor within PIN represented an admission by
the military regime that it would not attempt to
apply its land reform statutes to the sugar areas.
The tradtional social and political relationships
would be dealt with indirectly by removing the
poor families from the Northeast. 2

And although the relocation plans in the PIN have not yet
been effected, financing arrangements for the PIN termin
ated the SUDENE, at least in a meaningful sense . ^

The

military government seems to be committed to moving
away from regional economic and social planning, and al
though the PIN has been substantially undercut by alter
native projects, there has been no evidence of a return
to the SUDENE.

As former Finance Minister Delfim Neto

emphasized, "Brazil is one nation only, and the proposal
of the government is to develop all regions, and not only
24
this one or that one."
The next step is for the
official recognition of the gross inequities in the Brazil
ian rural sector, a step that so far has been slow in evolv
ing.
The Question of Violence, 1961--1966.

The analysis of

violence immediately prior to 1964 is clouded by several
difficult questions.

Publicity and exaggerated press cov

erage, inadequate records, and a tendency, especially just
before the coup of 1964, to categorize relatively normal
occurrences as extraordinary all tended to obscure the
actual dimensions of violence that might have been related
to substantially new patterns of political interaction.
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It is nevertheless possible to make several generali
zations regarding political violence in Northeast Brazil
during this period, and to outline the role of the SUDENE
in this context.
The first point is that political violence on the
part of nordestino peasants during 1961— 1964 was relative
ly rare outside of traditional and parochial expression.
It can be conjectured that few experienced direct contact
with innovative political ideas and organizers.

The for

mation of the Peasant Leagues was one of the few excep
tions to what Foreman identifies as the "culture of silence" that ruled the interior.

Francisco Juliao, the

legal counsel and honorary head of the Leagues, was a
Castroite and a product of the Northeastern rural environ-,
ment.

According to Page, "his sentimental attachment to

rural life was deep-rooted and constant, a quality not
uncommon among intellectuals of the Northeast.

As

legal defense attorney for peasants and the leftist
Peasant Leagues, Juliao had rejected any hopes that he
might otherwise have had for legal efficacy in the North-,
east.
A governor of Pernambuco once remarked:
"To my enem
ies, the law; to my friends, facilities," The aphorism
nicely catches the yawning chasm in Brazil between the
letter of the law and its application. The administra
tion of Brazilian justice was comparatively flexible,
but it bent.only one way— in the direction of wealth
and power. &
According to Page, Juliao established a reputation for
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defending Northeastern peasants after 19^1.

27"

and

later played a part in the organization and direction of
the Peasant Leagues.

It remains doubtful, however, that

Juliao retained more than a minor part of the control of
the leagues.

Besides their highly democratic character,

another element that supports this thesis is the wide
area that they encompassed, and the difficulty of trans
portation in the region.
Nobody really knew how many Peasant Leagues were al
ready in existence, and how many peasants belonged.
Claims ranged from Juliao’s solemn estimate that
League membership had passed the 100,000 mark to
the statement of a Catholic Priest working with
rural workers in Pernambuco to the effect that as of
January 1962 he would be very surprised if twenty
Leagues still existed in the state.
The Area Handbook for Brazil(ftArm.y Handbook") is slightly
more conservative than Juliao, citing 80,000 peasants as
peak membership.2^

It seems likely that the most common

characteristic of the Leagues was isolation from the cen
tral leadership.
Prior to 1962, League-inspired violence can be al
most wholly discounted, despite the charges of the news
media in the N o r t h e a s t . B u t in 1962 the Leagues "had
very definitely taken to the offensive."31

The offensive,

as it soon became clear, was a mixture of spontaneous re
actions to the ongoing process of oligarchical repression,
and a close identification with Cuba and Castroism, the
latter being probably mostly romanticization.

In 1962,

the "Dianopolis Caper", in which a former communist and
member of the Peasant League organizational staff became
instrumental in the formation of a guerilla training
camp, caused extreme embarrassment and subsequent poli
tical problems for the Leagues , ^

It might be added

that the discipline of the. camp was very low, the level
of indoctrination and training could in no way be con
strued as threatening to Brazilian authorities, and- the
ultimate police intervention which terminated the camp
was based on an unrelated political issue.

33

The camp,

in fact, appeared to have no other potential function ex
cept that of furnishing the material for a scandal.

Later

in 1962, a commercial plane crash in Peru led to the dis
closure of papers which identified the Leagues as recip
ients of limited financial support from Cuba.
This embarrassing disclosure resulted in the sus
pension of the modest financial support the Peasant
Leagues had been receiving from Cuba as of late 1961.
Castro had been reluctant, even then, to contribute
to the Leagues because he had doubts about-their rev
olutionary potential. Now he was certain.^
The political offensive of 1962 can perhaps be better de
scribed as political scandal, a series of unrelated in
cidents which weakened the Leagues and substantiated the
impression that they had created of weakness and dis
parity.
A second point that denigrates the allegation of
widespread political violence in the Northeast between
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1961 and 1964- is the degree to which such an allegation
was in the interests of development projects in the reI
gion. The Alliance for Progress in the Northeast, for
example, depended upon the hope that "success would demon
strate the effectiveness of the democratic- model of gov
ernment and diffuse the threat posed to the Alliance by
the spreading, allegedly communist-inspired Peasant League
in the .Northeast.

The SUDENE likewise had an interest

in mass popular reaction to the reputation of violence
that the media could create for the Leagues.

Roett notes

that "Juliao served Furtado's purposes in that the exist
ence of the Peasant Leagues was another good reason for
supporting the SUDENE."

Furtado was attempting to at

tract both ends of the political spectrum through his
posture toward the Peasant Leagues, and this endeavor re
quired an ongoing process of political juggling.
To denounce the leagues would merely earn the super
intendency the opprobrium of the left, but to endorse
them would mean the loss of support from the center
and the more enlightened elements of the right. The
best course for Furtado was one of using the leagues
to pressure the right for further concessions. He
could attempt to satisfy the left by saying that the
aims and overall purpose of the SUDENE coincided with
the leagues but that their methods were totally dif
ferent and suited different approaches. Furtado made
it clear, time and again, that he considered himself
to be a member of the political left, working for a
social transformation of Brazilian society not for a
violent upheaval that would destroy as much as it
might anticipate.37
And even the violence implied by Furtado was probably far
from revolutionary in the context of the Northeast.

Roett
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notes that the Leagues were ”a natural outgrowth of the
political culture, traditional and patriarchal, of the
Northeast,"

The absence of revolutionary strategy may

have reflected the traditional models to which the Peasant
Leagues closely adhered.

Roett concludes that "there was

nothing of the ’revolutionary peasant class consciousness'
39
about the leagues...,"
It was, instead, an almost classic case of populism
penetrating into the peasantry for the first time.
JuliSo attempted to replace the landlords in direct
ing the peasants how to conduct themselves political
ly. He played the role of an intermediary between
peasant and government, a broker who rarely attempted
to truly organize or institutionalize the l e a g u e s .
A third point underscores the extent to which much
of the political violence that occurred in Northeast Brazil
between 1961 and 1964 took the form of suppression of po
litical activities.

In a patriarchal society, the oligar

chy has often engaged in armed reaction to what it con
ceived as political threats, and organization of the
Peasant Leagues meant that landowners would again find
recourse to violence.
What contributed to. £thq} "reign of terror" in the
early years of the Peasant League movement was the
attitude of the Governor of Pernambuco, General
Cordeiro. de Farias. His enemies liked to point out
how badly misnamed he was, since cordeiro in Portu
guese means "lamb”. He took an inflexible position
in favor of law and order as it traditionally existed
in the countryside. His state police supported the
status quo to the hilt and did their best to crush
any peasant resistance to the exercise of prerogatives
by the landowners. *
While complete statistics have never been tabulated, there
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are numerous accounts of League meetings which were
terminated by the gunfire of hired hands.

Incidents of

peasant initiated violence also have been documented, al
though they tended to occur only in extreme cases of de
privation.

Page comments on this type of violence.

...if these conditions spawned ferment in the North
east, they also placed certain limitations upon those
seeking change. Starving, disease-ridden peasants do
not make the best soldiers in the army of national
liberation.^
While this statement need not be considered a universal
verity, it can nevertheless receive a modicum of support
with regards to the case of Northeast Brazil.

The

peasants of the Northeast were traditionally dominated
and extremely poor; in the absence of theoretical direc
tion, they would be unlikely to relate violence to politi
cal change.

Creation of the SUDENE and
Its Basic Sources of Strength
The Basic Plan.

I960 was seen by many as a year of great

importance for the people of Northeast Brazil.

The suffer

ing and privation resulting from the severe drought of 1959
had stimulated renewed national recognition of the prob
lems of the region, and had resulted in the establishment
of a program, directly subordinated to the President of
Brazil, that was charged with the responsibility of poli
tical and economic change in the Northeast.

Its goal was
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to create an infrastructure capable of overcoming the
numerous political and economic problems indigenous to
the region.

The SUDENE immediately became the shibboleth

of hope for numerous and by and large conflicting inter
ests.

It represented at its core, however, only those

interests of the poor, as the conservative oligarchy
would soon discover.
The SUDENE was an attempt by the development-minded
Juscelino Kubitschek administration to create a new
organization with the ability to confront and resolve
the pressing social and economic problems of the
Northeast and, at the same time, isolate and neutral
ize the traditional oligarchy of interests that op
posed modernization. 3
Nevertheless, aside from this small, although cohesive,
group of major landholders, the SUDENE would eventually
claim to support the interests of virtually all of the
interests of the region.
The responsibility for the original form and em
phasis of the program rested almost entirely with Celso
Furtado, a Sorbonne-trained economist from the Northeast
who submitted the official government report on the effects
of the severe drought of 1959.

Subsequently named to

direct the agency, Furtado. was entrusted with reconstruct
ing the Northeastern economy by three successive Brazilian
presidents.

A discussion of the SUDENE inevitably in

cludes the career of Celso Furtado because of his prominant position with regards to the agency, and also the
tendency within Latin America for bureaucracies to depend
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heavily upon isolated leadership positions, a condition
that is generally referred to as personalismo.
Furtado chose to emphasize three major points in his
overall plan for the SUDENE, and the scope of each of
them was sufficient in itself to comprise the makings of
a comprehensive development program,

Stefan Robock, in

his report to the Brookings Institution in 1963 noted
that i
Furtado's plan for action "is built around three
basic policies."
(1^Intensification of industrial '
investments: to increase regional employment oppor
tunities, reduce the adverse flow of private capital
out of the Northeast, and make the region less vulner
able to the drought.
(2)Reorganization of agriculture:
detailed plans which are to be developed should empha
size greater food production in the humid areas— to
stabilize food supplies in drought periods— and a
transformation of the semi-arid zones to increase pro
ductivity and drought resistance.
(3)Relocation of
population surpluses: the Northeast should be re
defined to include, the state of Maranhao to the north
which, possessed of moist soils, could absorb popula
tion surpluses created by a reorganization of the
semiarid agricultural economy.^
Although agricultural reorganization and population relo
cation played minor roles in the following SUDENE programs,
intensification of industrial development remained the
central focus of the SUDENE even after the military coup
of 1964.
In pursuing the industrialization of the North
east as a primary goal, Furtado emphasized the humanistic
aspect of the program— the creation of a broad spectrum
of jobs and the close interrelation of the prospective
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industies with the local economy.
A key part of Furtado's Master Plan for the Northeast
sought to industrialize the region in an attempt to
utilize the manpower which was a by-product of over
population and unemployment. If jobs could be created,,
then employees with newly-created purchasing power
would demand goods and services which would in turn
create additional jobs. Under the law a corporation
could invest in the Northeast a certain percentage of
its tax liability to the federal government.......
But SUDENE would retain the authority to approve or
disapprove of specific investment projects before
this tax exemption would w o r k . 5
Furtado had indicted the single-crop system, commonly practiced in Northeast Brazil, in his work Formacao Economica
do Bras.il, published in 1959* and argued the merits, and
some of the liabilities, of such a plan of industrialization.

It was clear from the beginning that this first

point was the priority goal of the SUDENE.
Generalized plans for regional industrialization
have tended to acquire political currency very rapidly in
Batin America, and Furtado was aware of both his assets
and liabilities from following such a course.

He em

phasized repeatedly the technical focus of his agency,
and although this ultimately earned the emnity of both
the right and left-wing political activists in the region,
its initial success was of great value, as Roett observes.
One of the strongest weapons possessed by the SUDENE
was its nonpolitical or technical approach to planning;
it was a regional approach that not only avoided local
and state antagonisms but argued for more rational use
of federal funds. The other federal agencies had to be
disciplined not because they were political and often
aligned with opposition groups but because a systematic
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coordination of national efforts required their^„
subordination to a central agency: the SUDENE. '
Nevertheless, Roett emphasized that "the new superinten
dent was in a dangerous position."
The clamor for economic change required social and po
litical development at the same time. His task was to
plan the new modes of political behavior to provide
permanent support for the economic program. Broad
change, not just technical, narrow plans, was at the
center of the SUDENE role in the region.^8
The ways in which the SUDENE was empowered offici
ally to effect change in the political milieu of the North
east were necessarily abstract.

The SUDENE itself was a

product of the Brazilian political system, and thus was
subject to its vagaries and weaknesses.

Paramount among

these was the tendency in Brazilian politics to write laws
in such a way as to maximize political promise while mini
mizing the specific provisions of change.

A brief des

cription of the official functions of the SUDENE serves
to illustrate this point.
In order to carry out its purposes, the SUDENE was em
powered to: examine and submit to the president sug
gestions related to the development problems; control,
without detriment to the responsibilities granted to
other agencies, the balances from budget grants, spe
cial credits, and other additional credits, fundings,
and special bank accounts of the executors of projects
included in the Master Plan; supervise the use of fi
nancial resources specifically destined for the devel
opment of the Northeast; suggest,..the necessary legis
lative steps for the establishment, adaptation, chang
ing or closing of agencies* taking into consideration
their efficiency or capacity, fitness to fulfill their
objectives, and, especially, the part assigned to them
for the execution of the Master Plan; and perform all
duties pursuant to its ends.^9
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The allusions to the principal advisory role of the SUDENE
were expressive of how the Brazilian Congress perceived
of the new agency's purpose.

Nevertheless, the SUDENE

had been given as much political power as any new agency
within the bureaucracy might expect*

the ability, given

the adroit and careful use of its advisory capacity, to
achieve at least a minimum of its required output— moder
ate political and economic change in the Northeast.

Fur

tado realized immediately that while his emphasis on tech
nological functions might avoid some of the more familiar
manifestations of Brazilian politics, his position as di
rector of a new agency required that he rapidly adapt to
the political conventions.

The structure of the SUDENE's

Deliberative Council underscored the degree to which Fur
tado* s time and energies would.be required by political
campaigning.
The Deliberative Council was the policy-making body
of the new agency. The council originally consisted
of twenty-five members*
one representative each of
the nine state governments in the Northeast; the
superintendent of the SUDENE; the director general
of the DNOCS; the superintendent of the SSo Francisco
Valley Commission; a representative of the general
staff of the armed forces; and one representative each
of the eight federal ministries, the Bank of the North
east, the National Bank for Economic Development, the
Bank of Brazil, and the S&o Francisco Hydroelectric
Company.50
in terms of the American regional development programs,
such as the Tennessee Valley Authority, this composition
was fairly typical.

However, it was an innovative politi

cal formula in the experience of Northeast Brazilian ad
ministration, and one that helped to a great extent to
bridge the hiatus between technical and political ac
tivities.

The ambitions of individuals and rival insti

tutions were defused by the provision of voting rights in
the Deliberative Council, and the regular absences of the
agency representatives and bank representatives meant in
effect that a greater share of the power in the decision
making process was given to the governors of the Northeast.
Furthermore, these memberscof the Council "could and did
claim to be the legitimate voice of the region in that
they were the only elected members of the group.
Political issues could theoretically be handled in a more
democratic and, in view of the political expertise of the
elected officials, more politically sophisticated manner.
The Deliberative Council, in effect consolidated
and simplified by the tendency of certain voting delegates
not to attend meetings, became vulnerable the control of
Furtado through the SUDENE"s executive secretariat.-^ The
secretariat controlled the technical apparatus of the SUDENE
as well as establishing many operational priorities.
The power to draw up the Master Plan rested with the
secretariat, as did the following: to co-ordinate and
supervise the execution of programs and projects in
the Master Plan; to draw up the annual, progress report
of the agency; to provide technical assistance to fed
eral, state, and municipal agencies; to maintain con
tact with the federal agencies subordinate to the
Master Plan in order to co-ordinate their activities
and facilitate maximum efficiency in their conduct;
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and to assist the council by supplying it with the
information, studies and projections necessary to
the performance of its duties.53
By 1961, governors of the Northeastern states were them
selves products of fierce political struggle, and many of
them were awed and attracted by the calm and efficient
machinery of the SUDENE organization; they rapidly tended
to become proponents of Furtado's administration.
Planning was the central focus of the SUDENE, and
the Master Plans were in many respects nuclei of the organ
ization.

Each Master Plan was designed with a primary po

litical purpose.

In Roett's words, it was charged with

guaranteeing "the maintenance of the coalition that had
endorsed the organization of the agency and the passage
in Congress of the first p l a n . " ^

It was the Master Plan

which could provide any political opposition with the
specific material necessary to indict the SUDENE, for "the
precise direction of the agency and the specific projects
of the plan were debatable and could arouse antagonism
and division."

<55

Furtado was aware of this condition,

and was able to a great extent to utilize the plans to
circumvent political opposition,,
The superintendency’s strategy of supporting basic in
dustry and infrastructure(nonantagonistic projects) fo
cused on areas that the traditional groups could little
afford to oppose; the projects were of a similar na
ture to those supported by the federal government.
The prime source of political support of the landed
groups remained the federal government. But on the
issue of opposing the SUDENE the usual meeting of in
terests did not take place. The traditional political
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elites in the Northeast found few
within the federal regime save in
agencies operating in the region,
tities were to be disciplined and
SUDENE within its Master Plan.5®

collaborators
the federal
and these en
directed by the

Nevertheless, it became incumbent upon Furtado to fully
develop the tools of political persuasion within the le
gal strictures of his position.

As Robock noted, Furtado

undertook a task that would require constant vigilance.
Although President Janio Quadros gave Celso Furtado
cabinet member status, neither Quadros nor his succes
sor, Jo&o Goulart, exerted strong political leadership
to have Congress approve the Northeast plan. To win
the political battle, Furtado and his dedicated asso
ciates developed five main sources of political
strength: the state governors in the Northeast, fed
eral legislators from the South, university student
groups, Brazilian nationalists, and the United States
foreign aid program.-*'
Although the basic strengths of the SUDENE were dependent
upon both its leadership and this strategic position, some
of its fundamental weaknesses radiated from these same
sources.
Inherent Weaknesses:

Political Versatility v. Personal!smo.

Dynamic leadership was crucial to the effective function of
the new agency, based on its abstract structure and duties.
Both the immediate and projected obstacles to even the
most limited political and economic change in the North
east Brazil were staggering.

The requisites of maintain

ing the necessary political coalitions to support the
SUDENE included sensitive political maneuvering.

Furtado

became preoccupied with both his complex and technical

plans for the development of the Northeast, and the equal
ly complex task of retaining the political power necessary
for the function of the agency.

In this environment, it

was inevitable that Furtado would become indispensible to
the agency.

His impressive professional and political

credentials lent themselves to the Brazilian tendency for
bureaucracies to become centered around specific person
alities, a condition widely described as personalismo.
While constituting nothing out of the ordinary,
personalismo based on Furtado deprived the SUDENE of an
important base of strength*

the anonymous institutional

legitimacy characteristic of industrialized nations.
Furthermore, his appointment by President Goulart to draft
a five-year plan for the Brazilian economy in 1962, a time
at which the SUDENE desperately needed to display politi
cal viability, was a disaster for the new institution.
When Furtado was away from the Northeast, his chief
deputy became Acting Superintendent, yet lacked the
power to make important decisions. Furtado could nul
lify anything the Acting Superintendent did during his
absence. Often decisions that should have been n)gde
in the urgency of the moment had to be deferred.58
A persistent and aggressive coalition of opposing interests
had formed by 1962, and was able to make destructive in
roads into the function of the SUDENE.

A key constituent

of this coalition, it would later be seen, was the U.S.
Alliance for Progress.
Personalismo within the SUDENE further damaged the
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prospects for development in the Northeast in the
long run.

After the military coup of 1964, the new

regime promised to fulfill many of the priorities of the
SUDENE, and to maintain the agency in a similar form.
The removal of Furtado from the superintendent®s office
proved to be more significant than the goals of the insti
tution, however.
The shock caused by Furtado's dismissal, the subse
quent psychological depression suffered by the agency
and a cutback in funds as a result of the governments
anti-inflationary policy came close to destroying the
SUDENE. That it has managed to survive at all must
count as a bright spot in the post-1964- p e r i o d . 59
Industrialization, it will be recalled, was one of the
SUDENE projects that required little agency financing.
A second critical shortcoming of development ef
forts through the SUDENE related to the scarcity of train
ed technicians in the Northeast.

The SUDENE tended to

consolidate technical expertise within an agency that
acquired strong political opposition, and in some regards
the whole development process became tied to the success
of one institution.

Robock explains:

The SUDENE choice may prove to be the best for the
Brazilian environment, but it has resulted in large
expenditures of scarce talent and energy on political
battles. Also, the political fight created high ex
pectations for rapid development and forced SUDENE to
concentrate in its first year of operations on quick
and dramatic actions, leaving many fundamental longerrange needs unmet.®0
This is not a new or unique problem in what has been cal
led "modernization".

David Apter has written that non

industrial modernizing societies tend to have more cha
otic and personalized social organizations, and that
"politics becomes the mechanism of integration, and
authority is the critical problem confronting leaders.
Although Furtado acted dynamically to seize and reinforce
the necessary authority, his position was dictated by the
implicit contradictions of, and dichotomy between, poli
tical and developmental roles.

Guy Hunter noted in

Modernizing Peasant Societies that
The most difficult balance to strike is that between
social and political aims on the one hand and econom
ic ambitions and opportunities on the other.62
A third important weakness regarding the SUDENE
was one that was indigenous to the sistema of Brazilian
bureaucracy.

Peter Ranis observed that

The great numbers within Brazil’s public bureaucracy
function as a sophisticated, literate, politicized,
and eloquent minority in a country where political
apathy is not unknown. They know well what they
want and are able to communicate these wants to the
decision makers.6 3
The articulation of independent political interests voiced
by the funcionarios of the SUDENE and the DNOCS, its rival
in the Northeast, seriously weakened the SUDENE.

When

the DNOCS entered into the opposing coalition of interests
along with the U.S. Alliance for Progress, the develop
ment process ceased to follow any kind of plan.
Growth of the Coalition of Opposing Interests.

Central to

the ability of the SUDENE to operate effectively in the
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Northeast was the degree to which it could amalgamate and
direct the aggressive private interests of the region.
The internal organization of the SUDENE was such that it
concentrated this important and difficult task in the of
fice of the superintendent.

It became incumbent upon Fur

tado to overcome both the inherent structural deficiencies
of the new agency, and simultaneously to direct natural
political resistance away from it.
Despite QhisJ formidable assets, Celso Furtado soon
discovered that he had to develop and utilize a keen
sense of politics in order to survive. SUDENE had the
authority to disperse most of the money allocated to
the Northeast by the federal government. Yet in exer.cising this authority, Furtado had to walk a slack
wire, swayed by the vagaries of national politics, the
meteoric rise of Miguel Arraes, and the agitation of
Juliao and his Peasant Leagues in the countryside.
At the same time the more boisterous of his enemies on
the right kept insisting that he was an agent of the
Communist Party, a small group of highly intelligent
industrialists and landowners in the Northeast set out
from the very beginning to chip away quietly, steadily,
iously at the foundations of his fledgling
Many of the fundamental activities of the agency drastical
ly increased political resistance to it.

Furthermore,

Furtado's defense of the agency placed him in a difficult
position.

As the driving force behind the organization,

and the personalized director, he discovered that many
of his arguments were suspect— his personal stakes in the
SUDENE tended to cut into his effectiveness as its over
seer.

This was especially the case with regards to the

SUDENE's role as manager and coordinator of entire region-

6?

al development program, as Robock observed in 1963.
By demanding complete and direct authority over all
aspects of the regional development and by establish
ing a regional plan which, despite a commitment in
principle to decentralized planning, was imposed from
the top down, the SUDENE movement was destined to
evoke the maximum of political resistance
Historical perspective confirms the inability of
the SUDENE and Furtado to overcome this problem,,

The mil

itary regime that took control of government in 1964 sup
ported some of the original plans of the SUDENE, such as
the stimulation of industrialization in the Northeast,
because of their practical bases.

It was never able to

support a fully integrated and coordinated development
plan, however technically satisfying such an effort
seemed to be.

Furtado*s focus on the technological bases

of development had been effectively eclipsed by unified
political resistance.

Perhaps the clearest and most doc

umented example of this involved the progressive aliena
tion of the USAID(United States Agency for International
Development) mission to Northeast Brazil by the SUDENE
program.
Although the deterioration of relations between
the two agencies will be dealt with in the following chap
ter, several factors of this breakdown should be mentioned
at this juncture.

First, the U.S. mission in Recife and

the funcionarios of the SUDENE maintained significantly
different conceptions of their respective roles.

While
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the SUDENE "awaited the USAID's identification of those
Master Plan projects that the United States was most in
terested in subsidizing,...the USAID awaited the SUDENE's
initiative in drawing up a list of USAID projects to be
accomodated by the Master Plan.
In retrospect, it was essential that any effective
collaboration between the USAID and the SUDENE depend
upon an immediate understanding of operational policy.
The longer the two agencies entertained comforting
misconceptions about their role, small differences
were able to grow into formidable obstacles. By the
end of 1962, a sufficient number of those differences
had accumulated to seriously impede accomodation.6?
An unwillingness of rival institutions to accept the
SUDENE's official role in the regional development pro
cess was certainly a contributing element to the;subse
quent dysfunction of the agency.

However, perhaps an

even more important factor was the SUDENE's inability to
recognize the myopia of organizations such as the USAID.
It is this shortcoming of the SUDENE, especially in view
of the agency's intelligent and centralized leadership,
that suggests the degree to which technological develop
ment plans distracted attention away from basic political
considerations.
The Master Plans.

Central to a basic understanding of

the ways in which the development roles of the SUDENE
were perceived by people and institutions in the Northeast
were the periodic Master Plans, or pianos diretores. These
were statements of purpose and general goals in the devel
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opment effort, along with specific project proposals,
and required periodic approval of the Brazilian Congress,
Pour Master Plans for the periods 1960-1962, 1963-1965,

1966- 1968, and 1969-1973 have included a variety of pro
posals reflecting a basic change in viewpoint and modus
operandi after 1964,
1.

2.

3.

The first Master Plan included*

A socioeconomic justification of the investment
policies of the federal government in the North
east and the definition of multiannual objectives
to be achieved in the basic sectors in which pub
lic investments are concentrated.
An analysis of private investment possibilities,
indicating measures to encourage such investment
and the areas of highest priority, in order to
receive aid from the various financing banks,
Criteria for federal-cooperation with the states
and municipalities.08

It was with regards to the battle for congressional ap
proval of this plan that the political dimension of the
SUDENE first became strikingly apparent.

After prolonged

debate, the Senate critically weakened the Master Plan
with the use of amendments on November 28, 1961.

The

public outcry that followed had the effect of forcing a
reconsideration and passage of the plan without amend
ments.

The general strikes in Recife and nationwide

public dissent had stopped what Roett describes as "the
attempts of the oligarchies of the Northeast to render
69
the new agency helpless."
Furthermore, the Master Plans demonstrated the
seriousness with which Furtado intended to undertake the
technical dimensions of development in the Northeast.
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Robock was able to quantify the emphasis on technical
development infrastructure in the first plan.
...the "creation of an economic infrastructure"
through road building and electric power expansion,
activities for which the Northeast has developed
planning competence and specific plans, accounted
for 70 percent of the total planned investment in
the first plan and about 76 percent of the first
congressional appropriation.7 o
Robock further noted that social development, an area
that would involve the greatest degree of political re
sistance, accounted for only 17 percent of planned in
vestment, and educational programs for about 1.3 per71
cent.
A breakdown of projects within the first Master
Plan reveals that "infrastructure, water and sewage pro
jects and agriculture, including food distribution, ac*
counted for 99 percent of total planned expenditures in
the first plan."'*2
The Master Plans may have been misleading, however,
to the extent that they did not include the emphasis that
Furtado and the organization of the SUDENE placed on the
stimulation of industrial investment in the Northeast.
Totally absent from the plans, for example, is mention of
the tax incentive and loan programs.

Robock explained

why.
Commerce and industry in the Northeast is almost ex
clusively in the hands of private enterprise. There
fore, the SUDENE plan, essentially a synthesis of the
major federal expenditures in the region, does not re
flect fully, on the basis of the share of total expen
ditures, the industrialization activities of the SUDENE.
The SUDENE law gave the agency authority to direct the
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BNB and the National Development Bank to give
priority in loans to approved industrial projects
and to give the following special inducements to
encourage industrial expansion in the regions
(1) special foreign exchange allocations or con
cessions; (2) exemptions from import tariffs and
taxes; (3) exemptions from certain domestic tsxes.
Industrialization remained central to Furtado's conception
of "modernization" in the region, and with regards to this
vital issue, the Master Plans tended to detract from a
primary goal by emphasizing the SUDENE's association with
secondary goals.
In a larger sense, however, the Master Plans were
important opportunities for the SUDENE to advertise its
technical focus, and to build a consensus necessary for
its effective function.

The precise representation of

the SUDENE plan was less important than the way in which
the agency was generally perceived.

Page observes that:

Celso Furtado's attempt to develop the Northeast
through the mechanism of rational planning and imple
mentation of an independent federal agency exercising
wide powers failed because of the fatal interdependence
of economic and political development. As he noted
later, in a somewhat rueful understatement: "The
struggle for power between the populist leaders and
the traditional ruling class is the crux of a politi
cal conflict which tends to thwart every attempt at
coherent planning by those who from time to time
govern the country.74
The Military Coup:

1964 and After.

On April 2, 1964, the

Armed Forces of Brazil formally assumed complete control
of the nation's political institutions after having suc
cessfully concluded a "bloodless" coup against the admini-
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stration of President Joao Goulart.

The full implica

tions of this power transition vis^a-vis the SUDENE soon
became apparent.

Furtado was immediately removed from

his government positions and prohibited from public ser
vice for a period not less than ten years.
ly went into voluntary exile from Brazil.

He subsequent
The position

of superintendent of the SUDENE has been occupied by a
succession of generals since 1964; as have many other
of the leadership positions in Brazilian government.

This

does not represent a highly irregular set of circumstances
in Brazil, however.

One observer has noted that

the military has, except for a few unusual years,
stood in the forefront of the Brazilian political
process. 75
Nevertheless, that process has undergone significant re
direction since 1964, and with it the institutions of
government.
The SUDENE was substantially changed after 1964.
Although some energy was directed toward the original goal
of industrialization in the Northeast, the fear of leftwing infiltration of the agency tended to stifle socially
meaningful projects.

Page offers an example.

Occasionally a glimmer of meaningful reform flickers,
such as SUDENE's attempt in 1968 to include in its
Fourth Master Plan a requirement that new industry
adopt profit sharing plans for their workers and de
velop ways to involve their workers In the management
of the enterprise. This was by no means a subversive
plot. SUDENE was merely implementing changes that
were specifically declared desirable by the new feder
al constitution promulgated by the military government
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in 1967. But a howl of protest both in the Northeast
and the center-south forced SUDENE to withdraw the
proposal,76
Much of the importance of the SUDENE as an instrument of
political and socioeconomic change after 1964 can be dis
counted,

Arraes has noted that the overwhelming majority

of Brazilian industries are foreign owned.

The SUDENE

program, in this context, constituted government assistance
to many foreign owned corporations.

Arraes observes that

•'the entry of foreign capital has been of no advantage at
all to the country since the sums leaving it always exceed
77
what comes in,"
Two rebuttals have been commonly employed by advo
cates of the military regime in Brazil to discount criti
cism of the SUDENE's descent toward inactivity after 1964,
The first is based on the belief that the national econ
omy had to achieve an exclusive status in development ef
forts before a major regional development plan would be
feasible.

Proponents of this perspective can point to

a major upswing in the Brazilian economy after 1968— cal
led an "economic miracle" by some— but they have little
recourse to subsequent examples of development in the
Northeast or rural sectors.
is, in fact, inconclusive.

The economic "boom" argument
In the first place, the boom

has not evinced a national progress, but rather., has been
essentially regional in character.
The so-called boom has contributed significantly to
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aggravating another disparity— that between regions
within Brazil.,..between I960 and 1970 there was a
reversal of the trend of the preceding decade toward
a greater share of the national income for the North
east.
It remains to be seen, of course, if the resources neces
sary for the development of the Northeast have finally
been accumulated and are merely awaiting application.
However, there are further indications that this is not
the case.
One of these indications is evident in the second
rebuttal to the call for a "boom” period to precede re
gional development plans.

That is that the Brazilian

"miracle" has begun to seriously weaken, and the con
ditions in the Northeast may well be a contributing factor.
i

M.S. Marzouk noted in Orbis, Spring 1974 that
Brazil's.impressive growth does conceal a basic struc
tural weakness— the inequality of income distribution.
The structure of production is a dual one wherein mod
ern techniques coexist with traditional methods.
Since industrialization has been accomplished by the
adoption of modern techniques, the incomes of those
connected with the modern sector have increased while
the traditional sector's income has not kept?gace and
may even have decreased in per capita terms.
In that the Northeast tends to be almost uniformly tra
ditional in its productive output, regional disparities
also appear to be part of Marzouk*s analysis.
A second defense to criticism of the post-1964
SUDENE program has taken the form of a denigration of the
original goals of the program, based on the assumption
that they are suspect in their political content.

The implications of this argument are that a new and
politically untarnished regional development program, one
that is based on acceptable goals and policy, might suc
ceed where a refurbished SUDENE program would not.

How

ever, regional plans constructed along these lines and
executed after 1964 have been singularly unsuccessful in
redressing the inequities of either the Northeast region
vis-a-vis the South, or the rural sector in a national
context.

The GERAN program is an example of this.

Following the recommendations of a USAID study under
taken by the Hawaiian Agronomics International Company,
the military regime announced, with appropriate fan
fare, the birth of GERAN, or the Special Group for the
Rationalization of the Northeastern Sugar Industry.
GERAN's goals were to bring about both the moderniza
tion of the sugar zone and a genuine land reform. The
idea was to stimulate the adoption of new machinery
and methods which would enable mill owners to produce
as much sugar as they were then producing, but on half
as much land. The remaining land would then be avail
able for crop diversification and distribution to the
peasants.
The creation of a new federal agency to deal with
the Northeast's most pressing problem indicated in
no uncertain terms SUDENE's loss of power, prestige
and importance.®0
Nevertheless, the GERAN completely ignored the factors
that have motivated the sugar producers for decades to
remain inefficient and to keep a large contingent of
subsistence-level workers.
dictable results.

The GERAN has met with pre

The president of the program "spent

most of his time dealing with mill modernization and lit81
tie time on land reform and social change."
Moreover,
the pressures of regional politics were again evident in
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the progressive dysfunction of the program.
GERAN was announced in 1966. In early 196? it was in
its organizational phase. Officials were expressing
the hope that it would begin to show results in five
years. That August the agency suffered an administra
tive shake-up, which continued for two years. In May,
1969# the government appointed an army colonel as chief
administrator of GERAN. His claim to fame was that he
had been in charge of security in Recife during the re
pressive period immediately after the coup. In June,
1969» GERAN was still in the organizational phase. By
early 1971. only one Pernambucan sugar mill had had
its modernization plans approved by GERAN, but no ac
tion had been taken. At the same time, GERA(Executive
Group for Agrarian Reform) had been created.
Regional and supraregional planning continues, although
indications are that traditional power structures, includ
ing the military, provide virtually all of the direction
to current programs.

National integration in development

planning has been rendered an impossible and illegal
task, despite the steadily growing inequity between urban
and rural sectors.
The military coup of 196*4- has at least solved the
authority crisis that beset the SUDENE, although it has
done so in what might be described as an arbitrary and
counter-developmental manner.

In that one source of

Furtado's political resistance in the Northeast emanated
from a new entrepreneurial class, it might be said that
part of that resistance to planned development has been
hobbled.
One of the most important examples of limitation of
pluralism under the regime is the relationship of in
dustrial and commercial groups to the government. As
analyzed by successful private sector figures who had

r
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occupied high bureaucratic offices during the
Castelo Branco regime, the entrepreneurial class
is subject to intimidation if not control by the
government, particularly through control of credit
and selective enforcement of regulations.^
The political change that effected a new perspec
tive with regards to development in the Northeast Brazil
during the 1950s and 1960s has been described widely as
populism.

Moderate alterations in the power structures

of the region allowed for the entry of certain groups
of people, most notably the landless peasants, into minor
consideration by the new politicians.

Some of the new

governors, such as Miguel Arraes of Pernambuco, proceeded
with plans to initiate widespread reforms in the political
system.

But the essential problem with populism in the

Northeast was that it failed to establish either a the
oretical framework, or an organizational infrastructure,
through which political development could be rationalized
and preserved.

It was, instead, patterned along the lines

of political pragmatism, a perspective familiar to
Brazilians, and one which has "often,..saved the nation
from bloody revolutions, political violence, and military
84fratricide ."
The spontaneous character of populism made the
SUDENE's task of integration of regional political inter
ests relatively impossible.

Rich landowners refused to

bargain with "castroite" peasants, and the two positions
progressively polarized, inevitably preventing the SUDENE
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from initiating its rural programs.

The military coup

has allowed the traditional landowning elite of the North
east to undermine substantive plans for political and so
cio-economic change in the rural sector.

Plans for region-

wide political and socio-economic development have like
wise been overcome by conflicting interests.

At this

juncture, the only solution for the problems of poverty
and privation in the region appears to be the official
recognition and rejection of the widespread condition
of human poverty in Brazil*s rural interior.
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CHAPTER I I I

THE SUDENE AND THE ASSAULT OF
UNITED STATES FOREIGN ASSISTANCE— 1961-1964
An Introduction to the Conflict and Outcome
The Problems Involved,

This chapter will concentrate on

those elements of the development process in Northeast
Brazil between 1961 and early 1964 that relate to the in
fluence of the American foreign aid program in that region.
The interaction between the SUDENE and the Alliance for
Progress program, represented principally in the Northeast
by the USAID mission, underscored the systematic proper
ties of the two agencies for three reasonss

first, the

great disparity between the two conceptions of the role
of the bureaucracy in Brazilian and American cultures.
Basic differences in the modi operand! of the SUDENE and
the USAID require a broad-based' analysis which emphasizes
the relation of functions to the overriding goals of the
institution itself, and this strongly suggests a systems
approach.

Second, in that the goals of the two institu

tions were significantly disparate, it becomes difficult
at certain junctures to relate specific decisions.

Again,

a systems approach is able to emphasize both discrete and
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long-range objectives in a sociological and political
context.

Finally, a systems approach can afford another

perspective with' which to examine the SUDENE in detail,
It should be emphasized that such an approach becomes
sterile when it is abstracted from the political and
economic setting of its object, and in this regard a
strict adherence to systems analysis will not be pursued.
It was apparent to many observers of the U.S. de
velopment effort after 1961 that, as it was then constitut
ed, it was incapable of addressing itself to the exigen
cies of positive change in the Northeast.

The first and

primary reason for this can be traced to the cultural in
ability of American institutions, and specifically of
foreign assistance agencies, to work constructively with
Brazilian institutions.
this inability 1

Two factors have contributed to

first, since the values and goals of

American institutions differ significantly from their
Brazilian counterparts, a state of competition based
upon relative differences often emerges during institu
tional interaction. . Second, political conditions in the
world in general, and in Latin America in particular, are
such that United States foreign policy institutions have
been reluctant to tolerate social and political upheaval
that typically accompanies the "modernisation" process.
Questions of security inevitably take precedence over the
practical requirements of political development when this

process challenges U.S. foreign policy goals.
The inability of U.S. foreign assistance programs
to deal effectively with the problems of development in
Northeast Brazil relates to a larger questioni

can a re

gional approach to political and socioeconomic development
in Northeast Brazil recognize and deal with the resistance
to change evinced by regional political interests?

It is

the contention of this thesis that it cannot, and this is
substantiated in two ways.

First, a large number of re

gional and supraregional planning and development agencies
have been established in the Northeast since 1964.

Neither

these agencies nor the decimated SUDENE organization have
been able to address the problems of poverty and privation,
especially prevalent in the Northeastern rural sector and
metropolitan shanty towns.

Second, the USAID mission,

which relied heavily on regional planning, ultimately
failed to make an impact on the major problems of the re
gion before its dissolution.

The failure of regional

planning in the Northeast has become, in the view of
this observer, a well-demonstrated thesis,
Lincoln Gordon, U.S. Ambassador to Brazil during
the early 1960s and writer in the field of Latin American
political development, became officially responsible for
the Alliance for Progress program in Brazil during his
tenure as ambassador.

He underscored the importance of

the program to the United States when he noted that "the
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Brazilian Northeast is recognized by all concerned as
one of the greatest challenges in Latin America to the
declarations of policy set forth in the Charter of Punta
del Este."1

The Charter established the Alliance for

Progress, and enumerated the points and conditions with
which the Latin American nations would be willing to co
operate with the new United States development projects.
In may respects, it was the region of Northeast Brazil
that prompted consideration by the new Kennedy admini
stration of the Alliance program.
The structure of the Alliance for Progress effort
in Northeast Brazil was not static.

However, the bulk of

the program was handled by the USAID mission to Recife,
although this was technically subordinate to the U.S.
consulate in Recife.

In fact, a major rift had widened

between the two agencies, principally because "the as
sistance agency insisted that the consulate was unaware
of the practical demands and problems facing the mission,"
The staff of the consulate, on the other hand, defensively
guarded its political priorities.
The consulate staff felt that USAID preoccupations
with forcing through its immediate impact program
was deleterious in the long-run to the regional po
sition of the United States. The deterioration of
relations between the SUDENE and USAID was becoming
alarming.3
The officials of the consulate had perceptively noted that
the USAID mission was effecting a two-year program that

2
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closely corresponded to the SUDENE's "First Master
Plan", thus establishing the probability of inter-agency
competition.

It was a condition that, in the eyes of the

consulate officials, would heighten the need for inter
agency cooperation.
Four central points emerge regarding the struc
tures of the SUDENE and the USAID mission to the North
east, and their interaction.

First, the SUDENE was gener

ally acknowledged by the Brazilian and American governments
to be the primary agency responsible for political and
socioeconomic development in the region between 1961 and
1964.

Second, the existence of the SUDENE during those

years was of great psychological importance to many of
the people of the region.

Third, the U.S. foreign

assistance activity in the Northeast during this period
was similar in many respects to other development efforts
in the region.

Fourth, the need for cooperation between

the SUDENE and the USAID mission, although recognized by
both agencies as crucial to the development process, came
to be ignored by both parties.

A brief explanation of

these points will help to illustrate the problem in a
clearer perspective.
Although the SUDENE was not the only Brazilian
agency actively engaged in development efforts in the
Northeast in I96I, it was established expressly to co
ordinate and direct the overall development process in

the Northeast.

The DNOCS, for example, had been

in operation in relatively the same form for eighty-some
years,

and although it purported to conduct a general

program for the alleviation of poverty and privation in
the Northeast, conditions had progressively worsened.
The emphasis of the DNOCS on the "hydraulic approach",
the building of dams, wells, and resevoir irrigation
systems, inadequately emphasized "physical facilities
as a defense against an act of nature."

The SUDENE

was virtually the only program in the region which both
recognized the social and political dimensions of the
problems of poverty and privation, and was empowered to
coordinate and direct other programs in an overall de
velopment process.
The SUDENE was widely perceived to be a crucial
step toward development of the region.

Major popular

demonstrations supported the strengthening of the First
Master Plan, and national political coalitions supported
its program.

Part of this public support was based on

the conception that the SUDENE would become a crucial
instrument in transforming the stereotype of bureau
cracy in the region.

Nevertheless„ from its inception,

the SUDENE itself conformed to some of the basic elements
of the stereotype of Northeastern and Latin American
Bureaucracies.

From the first, young and inexperienced

personnel were appointed to key positions; a pronounced
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esprit de corps soon emerged within the SUDENE funcionarios.

Furthermore, a nexus of undefined and vague

institutional goals quickly engulfed the decision-making
process.

Arpad von Lazar notes some other general

weaknesses typical of Latin American bureaucracies, and
to which the SUDENE eventually found itself subject.
The nature of Latin American bureaucracy makes the
prescriptions of efficiency and performance into a
difficult proposition. There is little respect for
lower-level government officials; pay scales are low
and many civil servants hold second jobs; recruitment
is usually based on political connections and many
bureaucracies are top-heavy and inflated with unneces
sary personnel. To complicate m a t t e r s t h e r e is a
general shortage of trained officials. °
Although the SUDENE did not immediately evince these
structural problems, except perhaps for the shortage of
trained officials, it inevitably acquired many of them.
Furthermore, the extent to which the SUDENE was compelled
from the very beginning to proceed slowly and cautiously
in the articulation and pursuit of specific goals resulted
in an increasing decline in public expectations and sup
port.
The U.S. development program in the Northeast
was representative to some degree of the development pro
grams in the region in two respects:

first, it was rela

tively broad in spectrum, and thereby tended to include
all of the basic development program types; second, it
emphasized the areas of public administration and pri
vate investment, and therefore met the criteria required
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by the Brazilian government for regional development
programs.

Lincoln Gordon, an important proponent of the

program, outlined its eight essential premises.
(1) establishment of mutually consistent targets in the
main economic and social sectors; (2) assignment of
priorities and estimation of costs and benefits of spe
cific major projects; (3) measures to direct the public
sector and to encourage private action in support of
the program; (4) cost estimates for .the program in do
mestic currency and foreign exchange; (5) a calcula
tion of internal resources available for development;
(6) analysis of the balance of payments and of the
necessary external financing; (7) the basic fiscal and
monetary policies required to fulfill the program
within a framework of price stability; and (8; the
machinery of public administration, including mea
sures for the cooperation of private organizations,
to make the program effective.7
Although these points applied to the entire hemispheric
Alliance for Progress program, they were very much in
evidence in the Northeast,

Moreover, latent within

these goals was the assumption that the Alliance machinery,
represented in the Northeast mainly by the USAID mission,
would direct all of the regional development efforts, and
serve as a spokesman for all foreign assistance projects.
Independent foreign assistance programs in 1961 included
technical and scholarship missions from and to France,
technical assistance programs in irrigation, textiles, and
well-digging from Israel, Japan, and Hungary, and loans to
the oil development agency(PETROBRAS) from Italy.®

All

of these programs lent themselves to the sort of general
management and coordination that had been advocated by
both the SUDENE and the Alliance for Progress.
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Given the character of the broad-based programs
of political and socioeconomic development planned by both
the SUDENE and the USAID mission to the Northeast, cooper
ation between the two became a foregone conclusion.

When,

in fact, it became apparent that the two institutions were
incapable, for a variety of reasons, of the intensive co
ordination and cooperation that regional problems required,
it was the SUDENE which immediately suffered an impairment
in its vital functions.

The reason for this is based on

the relative institutional structures and goals, and the
degree to which regional cooperation constituted the vital
constituent in the SUDENE's capabilities,
A Systems Analysis of the Problem.

An analysis of the

ways in which the USAID mission to Northeast Brazil hin
dered the function of the principal indigenous develop
ment agency in that region, the SUDENE, stresses the
kinds of arguments that the American development officials
might be willing to concede.

It is, in fact, important

to do this for several reasons.

In the first place,

the problems of the region are so complex and intense that
they provide an "easy" and convenient rationale for the
failure of the American program to effect significant
change in the region.

Second, the extreme polarization

of Latin American politics often obscures the under
standing of events and consequent results.

By adopting
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SELECTED COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES
OF LATIN AMERICA*

W&6NTIWA

CHILE

CUBA

fl&jUCO

Py6RT<5

M

VENEZUELA

□ Per capita national income
□ Per capita electrical consumption
H Infant mortality rate
H Children in school

*Jose Honorio Rodrigues, The Brazilians, trans.
by Ralph E. Dimmick(Austin and London: University of
Texas P r e s s 1969)* P« 155®
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BRAZIL*

] 2/3 of the territory and l/lk of the
population
1/3 of the territory and 13/ 1^ of the
population

*Jose Honorio Rodrigues, The Brazilians* trans.
by Ralph E. Dimmick(Austin and Londons University of
Texas Press, 1969)# P* 1^8*
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the perspective of systems analysis, this writer hopes
to present, in a form that would be acceptable to the
key protagonists in the U.S. foreign assistance program
in Northeast Brazil between 1961 and 1964, a cogent ex
planation of their failure to fulfill program goals.
Apter, in The Politics of Modernization, suggests
an approach to the resolution of the problems of politi
cal development in terms that suggest the case of North
east Brazil.

He relates political factors to an economic

process which he defines as the transition from moderni
zation to industrialization.
Countries approaching the point of change from modern
ization to industrialization include Argentina, Chile,
Brazil, and Venezuela. Paradoxically, as the transi
tion occurs, political factors become more rather than
less pronounced. Governments are less stable and
quite often more autocratic. Choices are uncertain,
and the uncertainty leads to non-rational acts of de
cision-making. 9
Moreover, a significant increase in the degree of autocra
cy in Brazilian government since the 1940s suggests the
growing presence of what Apter refers to as the "moderniz
ing elite".
elite*

He postulates three basic functions for this

first, the goal specification function, by which

is meant "the organization of resources around a defined
set of objects;" second, the institutional coherence func
tion, which means "the linkage of diverse roles into a
community;" and third, the central control function, which
"involves the mechanism of coercion in a s o c i e t y . T h e
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second function, institutional coherence, strongly sug
gests the role that the SUDENE tried to fill between 1961
and 1964; similarly, it was. this role that the USAID
mission to the Northeast adopted, to the detriment of the
SUDENE.
Samuel P. Huntington approximates Apter*s defini
tion of the institutional coherence function when he notes
that "the degree of community in a complex society thus,
in a rough sense, depends upon the strength and scope of
its political institutions."

11

Huntington explains insti

tutionalization in the following terms.
Institutionalization is the process by which organi
zations and procedures acquire value and stability.
The level of institutionalization of any political
system can be defined by the adaptability, complex
ity, autonomy, and coherence of its organizations
and procedures. So also, the level of institution
alization of any particular organization or procedure
can be measured by its adaptability, complexity, au
tonomy and coherence. If these criteria can be iden
tified and measured, political systems can be com
pared in terms of their levels of institutionaliza
tion. 2
This four-point analysis is useful in analyzing the de
gree to which Brazilian institutions can be said to have
developed politically.

Huntington emphasizes the way in

which autonomy and coherence are interdependent by stres
sing that "autonomy becomes a means to coherence, enabling
the organization to develop an esprit and style that be
come distinctive marks of its behavior."

He notes that

autonomy lessens the vulnerability of institutions to ex
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ternal forces, but cannot ultimately protect them against
internal changes,

"Rapid or substantial expansions in

the membership of an organization or in the participants
in a system tend to weaken coherence,

Autonomy be

comes insufficient as a guarantee of coherence of an in
stitution when internal stresses become manifest.
As Apter has observed, Brazil is an instance of a
nation undergoing the transformation from “modernizing"
to industrializing society.

In 1961, when both the Al

liance for Progress and the SUDENE were initiated, Brazil
had already established certain patterns in its develop
ment process which deeply affected the Northeast.
of these patterns was that of regional inequities.

One
The

South continued to rapidly outpace the rest of the nation
14
in economic development and technological advancement.
This had the effect of weakening the coherence of insti
tutions in the Northeast in that they depended on an ex
ternal coalition with interests in the South for their
autonomy.

Other elements have likewise tended to rigidi-

fy and weaken the coherence of Brazilian institutions.
New groups have been brought into the political arena
diversifying and expanding the electorate. Urban in
dustrial, commercial, and financial elements have
largely won national political control from the con
servative landowners(who, however, still dominate the
internal politics of many states, particularly in the
North and the interior), A rapidly growing urban mid
dle class is gaining in strength through its capacity
for political leadership, its importance in the bur
geoning bureaucracy, and its dominant position in the
communications m e d i a . 6
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One of the groups that brings into focus Apter*s
reference to the institutional coherence function is the
bureaucracy.

The Brazilian bureaucracy inevitably becomes

responsible for engineering the practical details of de
velopment programs such as the SUDENE.

The Brazilian

bureaucracy, like other Latin American bureaucracies, tends
also to articulate the goals and self-interests of its
members, and this can cloud and diminish the accomplish
ments of institutions.

At times, members of the bureau

cracy act as highly potent political groups.
The great numbers within Brazil#s public bureaucracy
function as a sophisticated, literate, politicized,
and eloquent minority in a country where political
apathy is not unknown. They know well what they want
and are able to^communicate these wants to the de
cision makers. °
Other general tendencies that impaired the coherence of '
Brazilian institutions during this period existed.

Popu

lar participation in the political system was rapidly ex
panding by 1961, and according to Ronald Schneider, "new
groups have been brought into the political arena, diver
sifying and expanding the e l e c t o r a t e . T h e s e groups in
cluded the urban industrial, commercial, and financial
18
interests,
and provided what Huntington has labelled
the "rapid or substantial expansion" in the membership
of various critical institutions.

Following his analysis,

this condition can be said to have made it imperative that
factors relating to institutional vulnerability be con-
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sidered as an integral part of development programs.
Institutional vulnerability can be described as
one way in which institutions become deficient in their
ability to achieve goals, or to function.

Both Hunting

ton and Apter have stressed the need for modernizing author
itarian structures, but they also insist on the need for
simultaneous political development, especially with re
gards to the growth of effective institutions.

Apter

explains this position:
Indeed, modernization emphasizes certain types of
authority. The particular combinations of right
that, embodied in authority, we call legitimacy are
quite often determined by the goals of the polity.
Failure to achieve such goals is thus prejudicial to
authority. This means that in many modernizing so
cieties the polity can only be secured by its suc
cesses. The efficiency of a regime determines the
quality of its authority.19
While it is not difficult to disagree with this equation
of efficiency and "quality" authority, the basic point
remains.

Modernizing institutions are undermined if

their principal goals are corrupted or destroyed because,
to paraphrase Apter*s remarks, authority depends to a 1
great degree on its ability to effect successes in the
struggle for development.

Moreover, Huntington observes

that institutions which have become vulnerable to the
sorts of internal changes mentioned earlier, pressures
which the Brazilian institutions were especially subject
to by 1961, are excessively vulnerable to "outside"
pressures.

In this light, programs like the Alliance

99
for Progress can exercise considerable influence on
indigenous institutions.
Huntington also underscores the need.in moderniz
ing institutions for "unity, esprit, morale, and disci
pline... in governments as well as in regiments."

Noting

that there is a need for political development concurrent
with social and economic development, he adds that "the
problems of creating coherent political organizations are
more difficult but not fundamentally different from those
involved in the creation of coherent military organiza21
tions."
Although Huntington’s emphasis on military
efficiency in the development process is undesirable in
terms of long-range political development, and his model
of "praetorian democracy" and "praetorian modernizing re
gimes" is probably counterproductive— again, in the longrun— his point does have some merit in the context of the
breakdown of efficiency of the SUDENE after 1961.

The

Brazilian gbverjnment, while not entirely lacking in the
expertise that Huntington deems so necessary in institu
tion-building, was victimized in the Northeast by foreign
intervention in the functions of a basic development
agency, the SUDENE.
In its effort to achieve sincere but inappropriate
foreign policy objectives, the United States inter
vened in the internal politics of the Northeast at
a critical juncture: as the battle between the tra
ditional elites and the reformers commenced. Burden
ed with the political necessity of demonstrating its
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competence within the Alliance for Progress frame
work, the USAID mission perceived a conflict between
its needs and the goals of the regional reform move
ment. Capitalizing on the natural dissatisfaction of
some elements of that movement, the United States
undercut the SUDENE.22
Roett has concluded that the USAID, in developing its own
program, "could only reconcile its objectives with region
al development by condemning Furtado and the superinten
dency as divisive and, ultimately, as cohorts of the radi- ■
cal nationalism that permeated and, ultimately, destroyed
the constitutional system."2-^ Under the aegis of an "al
liance" the USAID mission to the Northeast

seriously

weakened the only agency in the Northeast capable of co
ordinating the regional development process, and at a time
when that agency was especially vulnerable to outside in
fluence.
Huntington continually emphasizes the importance
of organizational adaptability.

His point is that or

ganizations like the SUDENE are created to perform types
of activities which can be described as related functions,
or even a single function.

"When that function is no long

er needed, the organization faces a major crisis i

it

either finds a new function or reconciles itself to a
lingering death."

The machinery of the SUDENE, in other

words, could not be expected to remain intact for very
long after its primary function, coordination of the
development of the Northeast, had been usurped.
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Another of Huntington's points that relates
closely to the situation of the SUDENE between 1961 and
196A concerns development levels.

He notes that high

er levels of institutionalization result in the greater
ability of institutions to adapt to change.2"* The
SUDENE organization was an attempt at creating a high
level institution in a region where the resources, ex
pertise and culture were insufficient.

Although it

has been described as a "radical innovation", and "admin26
istratively autonomous",
it could be relatively easily
outmaneuvered by the USAID mission.

The latter organi

zation was capable of constantly adapting to new con
ditions, whereas the SUDENE experienced some difficulty
in altering its program after a Master Plan had been ap
proved.
It is perhaps ironic that although the SUDENE was
not able to adapt easily to the political changes taking
place in the Northeast, its program of political "modern
ization" of the Northeast utilized adaptability as a
standard of viability.
The superintendency did not set out to destroy all
that was old, but the essential issue was that of
adaptability: if old structures were unwilling or
unable to demonstrate vigor and innovativeness, they
were to be removed. The emphasis on immediate demon
strations of success was directly related to the
double problem of culture and structure: for the
new structures to gain acceptance in the Northeast,
success was required; and for the needed change in
the political culture to take place, the new struc
tures required acceptance. '
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The tendency for traditional institutions to resist
innovation and adaptability became a useful tool in
the USAID campaign against the SUDENE.

It was further

reflected after 1964-, when "the SUDENE was emasculated„
and the foreign policy of the United States was re
garded by some of the analysts as the decisive factor in
the failure of the superintendency to make a significant
contribution to the modernization of the Northeast.”^®
The ideas of both Huntington and Apter with
regards to general characteristics of "modernization"
are incomplete, especially with regards to Northeast
Brazil.

Although they do provide the basis for arguments

that this writer feels would be convincing even to the
officials of the USAID mission in Northeast Brazil, they
are very general in content0

Ronald Schneider, for ex

ample, noted that active political parties in developing
nations are taken for granted by the two authors, and
"the function that

(Jheyl postulate for parties is beyond

29
that which they have ever effectively fulfilled in Brazil.*5
Another work which deals with the problems of political
and economic development, and which has some currency
among social scientists and development analysts, is
Comparative Politics t

A Developmental Approach, by

Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell.

As with Hunting

ton and Apter, the ideas expressed by Almond and Powell
are repugnant to people who are convinced that centralized
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authority is not necessarily the key to political de
velopment.

Nevertheless, this kind of analysis has played

an important role in U.S. foreign policy, and should
therefore be utilized.
Almond and Powell refer specifically to the Bra
zilian government in their categorization of authoritarian
systems, citing it as an example of "modernizing author
itarian" government.-^

Moreover, they define political

systems as relating directly to coercion, especially at
the stage in which political development is rapidly taking
place.

This general statement is qualified, however.

We are not, then, saying that the political system is
concerned solely with force, violence, or compulsion;
rather, that its relation to coercion is its distinc
tive quality. Political elites are usually concerned
with goals such as national expansion or security, so
cial welfare, the aggrandizement of their power over
other groups, increased popular participation in pol
itics, and the like; but their concern with these val
ues as politicians is related to compulsory actions
such as law-making and law enforcement, foreign and
defense policy, and taxation. The political system is
not the only system that makes rules and enforces them,
but its rules and enforcements go all the way to com
pelling obedience or p e r f o r m a n c e , 3 1
By creating a model of "modernizing authoritarian" regimes
that does not rest on active political parties, these
authors provide generalities which might be applied more
directly to Brazil.
A major problem in defining the sort of political
development that would be consonant with "modernization"
in Northeast Brazil depends in large measure on a defini

1G#

tion of that concept.

Apter notes that there are problems

in defining "modernization" simultaneously for industrial
izing and rural societies, and he adds that*
Modernization may be described in non-industrial so
cieties as the transposition of certain roles— pro
fessional, technical, administrative— -and the trans
position of institutions supporting these roles-—
hospitals, schools, universities, buteaucracies.
Non-industrial modernizing societies, however, lack
the powerful integrating thrust found in industrial
societies. Social organizations are more chaotic and
confused. Politics becomes the mechanism of integra
tion, and authority is the critical problem confront
ing leader s.
In considering the Brazilian Northeast, special care is
required in distinguishing between the Brazilian political
and economic milieu, representative of an industrializing
society, and that of the Northeast, basically a non-indus
trial society.

The two, of course, are by no means dis

tinct, and many generalizations regarding Brazil in general
are also valid for the Northeast.

Moreover, Guy Hunter's

observation that the "strategy of rural development" is
a critical component of "the total strategy by which the
political aims of the society are to be achieved,"^
further integrates the example of Brazil and its Northeast.
A relation of structural functionalism to politi
cal development is the primary thesis of Almond and Rowell,
and it remains close in form to the description of ruralbased political development discussed by Apter.

Almond

and Powell define the political system as including "all

35

structures in their political aspects,

a somewhat dif-
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ficult definition to unravel.

Nevertheless, there is

some indication of the meaning of the word "political"
in the definition of political functions, which include
three major categories?

capabilities, conversion proces

ses, and system maintenance and adaptation functions.
Capabilities include regulative, extractive, distribu
tive, and responsive functions.

System maintenance and

adaptation functions include the socialization and recruit
ment of people.

The category "conversion processes"

offers an important insight into the kinds of arguments
concerning political activity in Northeast Brazil to
which the USAID functionaries might be most receptive;
it likewise underscores the ambiguity of their task there.
Conversion processes are defined by Almond and
Powell as "the ways systems transform inputs into outputs.
In the political system this involves the ways in which
demands and supports are transformed into authoritative
decisions and are implemented."-^

These processes are

divided into six specific functions, or?
the ways in which (1) demands are formulated(interest
articulation); (2) demands are combined in the form of
alternative courses of action( interest aggregation);
(3) authoritative rules are formulated(rule making);
(4) these rules are applied and enforced(rule appli
cation); (5) these applications of rules are adjudi
cated in individual cases(rule adjudication); and (6)
these various activities are communicated both within
the political system, and between the political system
and its environment(communication),37
Although these specific functions generally interrelate
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with "capabilities" and "system maintenance and adap
tation" functions, they might be said to particularly
apply to the case of Northeast Brazil in that they sug
gest reasons for the failure of the USAID mission to that
region, and its related inability to recognize the gen
eral characteristics and requisites of constructive poli
tical change there.
Functional analysis may provide an important per
spective for examining the political conditions of the
Northeast between 1961 and 1964, not only because it
rationalizes possible choices of action available to
USAID officials, but also because institutions consti
tuted the central theme of development in that setting.
Apter has summarized what he considers to be the primary
value of the functional approach.
The value of functional analysis in general, then,
is that it helps us to understand the purposes and
meanings of actions. Cognitive mapping is the task
that it undertakes. The viability approach merely
sharpens the focus, restricting the analysis of pur
pose to the survival of the unit and a set of mean
ings based on that purpose. This helps us to under
stand the properties and widely differing activities
of certain systems and leads to the exploration of
different levels of meaning, latent and manifest,
cognitive and emotive. In this sense functionalism
relies first on semantic empiricism and only second
on operational empiricism: that is, it is pragmatic
before it is operational.38
Functional analysis, in this perspective, might have been
a pragmatic tool available to the USAID officials, one
that could ostensibly have been used to establish posi-
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tive and negative criteria for use in the development
process.

In the case of the Northeast, the failure of

the USAID mission to effect positive change in the re
gion can be assessed in terras of the extent to which it
hindered the function of an institution(the SUDENE) whose
goals it supposedly embraced, based on the Charter of
Punta del Este.
Interest articulation

is the most applicable of

the conversion processes to the effect which the USAID
had upon the function of the SUDENE.

Almond and Powell

note that "in societies where a small elite makes all the
political decisions, where the articulation takes place
from person to person or within a small group, it is a
powerful factor in explaining the course of political
30

decisions."

Such was the case in Northeast Brazil.

Furthermore, the two authors observe that "such inter
est articulation has been a common feature, for example,
in the history of strongman dictatorships,"

The ten

dency of Brazilian bureaucracies to evince personalized
leadership patterns, or personalismo, relates closely to
this comment.
In describing this function, Almond and Powell
make an important distinction.
The articulation of interests may be instrumental or
affective. An affective articulation takes the form
Of a simple expression of gratitude, anger, disappoint
ment, or hope. An instrumental articulation takes the
form of a bargain with the consequences realistical-
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ly spelled out. The instrumental style is common
in American politics# where associational interest
groups often threaten to make their future financial
or voting support directly contingent upon a legis
lator’s support of a certain bill,^.
The Brazilian expression of interest articulation# in mark
ed contrast with the American expression, is typically
affective.

The inevitable conflict between these two

forms in the absence of recognition of this distinction
is exemplified by the relationship between the SUDENE and
the USAID after 1961.
SUDENE efforts at political change were difficult for
the staff of the USAID mission to understand. Gradu
ally those efforts were seen as part of a premeditat
ed policy to sabbotage the USAID program itself. A
concept such as political development# or political
modernization, had little meaning in the scheme of
obligating funds, signing project agreements, and de
feating the security threat posed by communist sub
version. The constraint of organizational demand for
performance and success in the Northeast resulted,
ultimately, in the neglect and resentment of what the
SUDENE was attempting to achieve. As the USAID pro
gram became an end in and of itself, little room re
mained for the original objectives of Brazilian re
gional development .^"2
The USAID mission eventually made their support of the
SUDENE program contingent upon specific positions, such
as a firm stand against communism, a stand which had lit
tle value or relation to the tasks before the new agency.
Both institutions were articulating their interests# but
the manner in which the USAID mission accomplished this
function was strongly instrumental— specific and narrowly
defined goals pursued through strict bargaining.

The ar

ticulation of interest by the SUDENE was, on the other
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hand, affective— simple expressions of hope were chief
motivating factors in the minds of lower eschelon func
tionaries, and goals were very generally defined and
"hopeful" in essence.
Another dimension of the contrasting expressions
of interest articulation experienced in the relationship
between the SUDENE and the USAID mission to the Northeast
is suggested, in generalized terms of Latin America, by
Kenneth F. Johnson in an article that appeared in The Wes
tern Political Quarterly.

He observed that "because a

genuinely competitive and collaborative spirit is lack
ing, Latin Americans are suspicious of impersonal institutions which control and allocate capital." ^

According

to Johnson, the social pluralism that accompanies this
attitude has a moderating effect on political behavior,
tending to limit "excesses" such as organized radical
44
political activity.
The fears of the USAID staff
that the SUDENE programs were essentially communistic,
and therefore threatening, were culturally unfounded.
In fact, the SUDENE was functioning roughly according
to general Latin American standards.
Because of the relative lack of social plurialism in
Latin America, performance entities become psychologi
cally compartmentalized and politically semi-autonomous. Vocational roles tend to circumscribe social
attitudes and political attachments. Armies, bureau
cracies, legislatures, are found each with its own
highly subjective elan vital, an aggressive expansion
ist force marked by the all-consuming lust for control
and easily infused with a moral purpose to justify
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the intrusion upon other

roles.

In this sense, representatives of an instrumentalist soci
ety, the United States, effectively utilized bargaining
and boycott to suppress the functional assertiveness of
the SUDENE, and thereby modified and substantially weaken
ed its natural pattern of interest articulation.
Almond and Powell define interest aggregation as
"the function of converting demands into general policy
alternatives."^

Both differentiation between, and func

tional specialization of, specific political structures
are included in this category.

The authors observe that

in authoritarian regimes(as are personalized bureaucracies)
"aspirations often outstrip capabilities in the initiation
of modernization, and a nearly intolerable burden is quite
commonly placed upon the aggregative function."
comment is relevant with respect to the SUDENE.

hr?

This

The

institution had been saddled from its inception with de
mands that could not easily be fulfilled in the shortrun.

The Governor of Pernambuco, Miguel Arraes, had

campaigned on the "He Ninguem" platform, which implied
that the SUDENE would play a large role in elevating the
landless peasants to a position of utility, security and
importance.

The officials of the USAID mission, in

contrast, dealt with "interest aggregation" in terms
of clearly defined goals which tended to be expressed
in concise economic terms.

Ill

In 1963 Ambassador Lincoln Gordon, the embodiment
of cultivated rationality, met with Arraes in the
governor's palace. Gordon tried to explain how the
uncontrolled wage increases in the sugar zone were
contributing to the Brazilian inflation. Arraes
failed completely to grasp these macro-economic re
lationships, but he did .understand that, in the
sertao and the sugar zone, to elevate Joe Nobody
into a somebody was to make a revolution in Brazil.
Gordon(and the U.S. development economists in
charge of the AID program) had no more affinity
with that revolution than_Arraes had with Gordon's
sophisticated economics.^®
Constructive cooperation in this situation was a diffi
cult proposition, but was nevertheless the only way in
which the official goals of the Alliance for Progress,
as agreed upon by Brazil and the United States, could be
fulfilled.

But in spite of this, "once the United States

recognized that the social change taking place in North-r
eastern Brazil was inherently disorderly and even poten
tially revolutionary, it backed off and shifted its con
centration to the core society, hoping that by gradual

9
expansion the core would eventually take in the marginals.*'
Interest aggregation can also be observed in
institutions as an indicator of the ways in which changes
occur.

The perspective of the USAID mission to the

Northeast, for example, differed significantly from that
of the SUDENE in this regard.

The USAID officials

quickly became hostile and distrustful toward what they
perceived as acts of irrational interest aggregation.
After the SUDENE was significantly altered in 1964, par
ticularly in its expression of interest aggregation in

112

a cultural sense, it consequently lost its ability
to effect political and socioeconomic change to any
significant degree.
The rule-making and rule adjudication functions
add further detail to the relationship between the two
institutions.

Almond and Powell classify these two cate

gories as the "governmental functions"^® and note that
"rule making in traditional and primitive political sys
tems tends to be either a charismatic process or a slow,
incremental process of accumulation of tradition, which
is in part a derivative of the day-to-day rule enforce
ments and rule adjudications of the systems."^

While

much of the rule-making power relative to political de
cisions in the Northeast was out of the control of the
SUDENE's leadership, there were decisive elements of
practical application that required just the sort of
"charismatic process" that Almond and Powell refer to.
Furthermore, the degree to which the SUDENE could engage
in the rule-making process in its immediate environment
was directly related to its own internal rule-making
process, which was tied to new standards and ideas, new
precedents, tempered by the culture and traditional
standards of bureaucratic behavior.
The rule-making function can be related to the
activities of the USAID officials in several ways.

Al

though not directly involved with the promulgation of the

\

treaty that established the Alliance for Progress, they
had a relatively free hand in applying general standards
of procedure in specific instances.

They likewise tended

to establish rules of acceptable action for the'institu
tions with which they cooperated.

The recommendations

of the Charter of Punta del Este— which included bi
lateral agreements to substantially alter archaic landtenure practices— constituted both prescriptions and
strictures of behavior that were significant.

Although

Brazilian representatives had agreed in principle to the
articles of the Charter, there is no evidence to sug
gest that the officials of the institutions of the
Northeast accepted, or even adequately understood, the
complex development rules that were implied therein.
Moreover, the degree to which the USAID officials sought
to take up leadership and responsibility in initiating the
reforms of the Charter emphasized their active subversion
of the rule-making function of the SUDENE by these ex/
ternal agents of development. Levinson and Onis, in
their book The Alliance That Lost Its Way, note that
"external assistance, whether capital or technical, is
important, but it cannot substitute for Latin American
leadership in dealing with such issues as population
policy, agrarian reform, and urban development."^2
Both the SUDENE and the USAID mission engaged in
what can be described as the rule-making function, al-
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though the USAID mission only had access to sanction— the
ability to withhold vitally-needed assistance.

This be

came especially apparent after the USAID mission became
openly disenchanted with the policies of Furtado and the
SUDENE.
When the United States assistance agency found that
its Brazilian partner did.not share its enthusiasm
for using the Northeast to accomplish United States
political goals, the USAID sought allies among other
regional groups. In so doing, the United States pro
vided a counterweight to the SUDENE. The USAID
threatened to weaken the Brazilian agency's position
as co-ordinator of economic development and primary
architect of the attack on the political patriarchalism that continued to flourish in the area. The con
sensus created by the SUDENE for pursuing economic
growth and encouraging graduated political differ
entiation, while the national political system was
manifesting signs of disintegration, was undermined.
Political groups in the Northeast saw a convenient
opportunity to gain economic support for pet projects
in exchange for expousal of United States political
goals.53
Political considerations which did not necessarily re
flect the goals and purposes of the Alliance for Progress
as specified in the Charter of Punta del Este were carried
out with increasing effect, demonstrating both the rulemaking impotence of the SUDENE, and the power of the Al
liance to undermine political development in the region.
The rule application function has a direct
bearing on the breakdown of the relationship between the
SUDENE and the USAID mission in the Northeast.

Almond

and Powell have observed that "as a political system ex
pands in size, or faces an increasingly complex environ-

U5

ment or a widening range of tasks, the pressures to
develop specialized rule-application structures are inex-
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orable."

The authors further note that "it becomes im

perative that the system develop capabilities to meet new
goals or pressures* effective rule application is a neces
sary prerequisite to such development.""^

The SUDENE was

created specifically to serve the rule application func
tion in the Northeast, and undermining the effective func
tion of the SUDENE likewise represented a significant
weakening of rule application in the development process,
Levinson and Onis have suggested that a major area
of importance in the Alliance, one that Almond and Powell
would argue is important to all of the conversion proces
ses, was educational reform.

In Northeast Brazil, a

complex adult education program was immediately establish
ed after i960 under the aegis of the USAID mission and the
SUDENE.

In 1963 and 1964 about four thousand people were

enrolled in this pilot program in the two states of Rio
56
Grande do Norte and Alag^as.
The USAID mission, which
was headquartered in Recife, became dissatisfied with the
political content of the program in January of 1964, and
terminated all United States support*

According to Lev

inson and Onils, "this act was merely one manifestation
of an insistence on rationality and order in a situation
57
of revolutionary change,"^

As it became increasingly

clear in the Northeast that social,■
<political, and econ-
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omic change were implicitly interrelated, the USAID
officials began to hesitate in upholding all of the
provisions of the Alliance,

While their purpose in Bra

zil was to aid in the multi-faceted process of political
and economic development, their daily activities came
to involve just the opposite— the suppression of the
disorderly development process.

Termination of the

United States support of the education program, in this
milieu, became inevitable•
The Paulo Freire [education] program was indeed sub
versive in its basic technique of deliberate provoca
tion and in its purpose of developing a critical fac
ulty, creating a sense of the capacity and moral re
sponsibility of the individual to change his life and
the world around him. In a hierarchical, paternalist
ic society where the coronel's word was law, this em
phasis upon critical thinking and individual and com
munity action was destructive of traditional values.
The Freire program was revolutionary in the most
profound sense of the term,
Moreover, the program obviously did not conform to the
prerequisites of lasting political "security", especially
from the context of U.S. foreign policy.
The problem of education reform in the Northeast
provides an explicit example of how the USAID mission chose
to suppress development in the name of national and inter
national security.

In 1962, "adaraent opposition to a

school-construction program came from the education di
vision of the QJ.S3

embassy, which argued that the prob

lem of education in the Northeast was curricular and that
teacher training was essential."^

Indeed, the superin-
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tendent of the SUDENE, Celso Furtado, focused attention
on this problem and urged that "SUDENE must first create
a new mentality among university students."^0

However,

cooperation between the SUDENE and the USAID staffs in the
creation of a new curricular base soon became impossible,
and "security" considerations received the attention of
U.S. policy makers.
Discussions in Cthe U.S. embassy in] Rio de Janeiro
moved away from the comprehensive program planning.
Protests by the education division and other USAID
members were overcome by the political staff of the
embassy? anything that economic assistance might do
to combat communist influence in the Northeast must
subordinate purely economic development goalsj the
Peasant League agitation and the steady increment of
leftist, nationalist sentiment in urban areas re
quired immediate attention? the school ^building]
program would serve as access into the region,
Difficulties in defining the communication func
tion are explained by Almond and Powell as related to its
pervasive and all-encompassing character.

They focus, for

the purpose of definition, on "the most general and significant flows of i n f o r m a t i o n m the political systems."
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In a description that might be strongly related to the
relationship between the SUDENE and the USAID mission to
the Northeast, Almond and Powell observe that*
The formal structures in a political system, constitute
a particularly important channel of information. The
governmental structures, particularly the bureaucracy,
make it possible for the political leaders to communi
cate directions for rule implementation to various po
litical office-holders in an efficient and unambiguous
fashion. The lifeline of communication holds the en
tire governmental structure together and makes pos
sible coordinated implementation of laws and the mo
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bilization of societal resources.
In another observation that can be said to relate to the
breakdown of the relationship between the SUDENE and the
USAID mission to the Northeast, Almond and Powell add that
"social mobilization is in large part a communications
phenomenon.

Urbanization, literacy, secularization of

traditional ties and beliefs, employment in a wage economy,
and other concomitants of mobilization are inextricably
involved with exposure to new structures and processes of
communication."

Communication, then, is vital to pro

cesses of change, and to the adaptation of institutions
and newly formed authority positions to the political mi
lieu.
The wide disparity between the expression, or com
munication, patterns of American and Brazilian institutions
was an important element in the decisions that led to
redirection of American foreign aid to the Northeast.
The SUDENE was subjected to a barrage of technical requi
sites as the USAID mission began to suspect that U.S.
foreign aid might be violating its own “national interests'*.
Furthermore, the widening political battle of the SUDENE
in the Northeast meant that increasing amounts of infor
mation were becoming necessary as justification for pro
gram implementation.

Again, with regards to this type of

problem, Almond and Powell remark that "as a consequence
of high volumes of information, and of the technical na
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ture of much information, a very large and complex system
is pushed inescapably either towards a degree of decentral.

.

.
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.

ization, or towards inefficient and non-rational actions."
Both the SUDENE and, perhaps more important, the federal
• government in Brasilia were experiencing a massive increase
in information requisites.

The basis of the SUDENE’s pro

gram was its political support from the federal govern
ment, since its primary purpose in the Northeast was to
overthrow the traditional power structure.^

The general

ized methodology by which the USAID "disqualified" the
SUDENE from the aid program was especially pernicious to
that organization.
It is ironic that the USAID fear of Peasant League
agitation, and of the SUDENE's apparent non-concern with
regards to the situation, was not shared by the group in
the Northeast with the most stake in the status quo.
The Brazilian deputy Francisco Juli&o, head of the
Peasant Leagues of the Northeast, who had recently
proclaimed himself a Castroite, seemed to be ter
rifying all the newspaper* readers in the United
States. But he did not frighten the Brazilian oli
garchs in the least, as is shown by the fact that
they made no move whatsoever toward agrarian reform.
The oligarchs knew something the American newspaper
correspondents did not knows that the Juiiao
family were fazendeiros (great landowners), and that
all his political rhetoric was only that— rhetoric.6?
Whether or not Juiiao's association with a landowning
family discounted his ability to become a revolutionary,
it is important to note that the USAID officials were
not sensitive to real indications of political change.
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They were not, in fact, sensitive to the most effective
means to prevent the undesired change.

As Roett noted,

"in this instance, the SUDENE, not the United States
foreign assistance and its impact programs, was the more
appropriate means of robbing Juiiao of his potential fol68
lowing,"
Another manifestation of the critical breakdown
of communication, in this instance in the internal de
cision-making process of the U.S. foreign assistance
effort, resulted from a disparity between high-level
American goals, and those proposed from the field.
It appears that the emphasis shifted or became more
fluid in the USAID and the White House. While the
survey team report was, in theory, an exemplary mod
el for foreign assistance, it did not meet the rap
idly changing United States security interests in
the Northeast. The program discussed in Brazil, and
which Furtado still assumed to be the position of the
United States, had been downgraded to meet the policy
need of a dramatic political impact in the Northeast.
While the survey team report would remain a part of
the subsequent policy determination, it would not be
what Furtado and the survey team had mutually under
stood it to be. *
An initial agreement on the conditions for assistance was
progressively rendered meaningless, and the inability of
the SUDENE officials to grasp the significance of this
change became a critical factor in the agency's function.
It was not necessarily the ineffectiveness of the
SUDENE which was responsible for this dysfunction in com
munication, however.

The officials of the USAID mission

were contradicting their goals in the Northeast by stres-
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sing high impact programs at the expense of long-range
political, social, and economic development.

By acting

covertly and independently, they were inexplicably(at
least from the standpoint of rational explanation) ig
noring their purpose in the region.
While the work by Almond and Powell could not have
figured in the U.S. decision-making process as early as
1963, it nevertheless expresses the non-ideological and
social science explanation that can be assumed to have
the most appeal to government bureaucrats.

There are

numerous ideological and moral arguments that would
condemn the actions of the U.S. foreign assistance pro
gram in the Northeast between I96I and 1963.

The criti

cal fact is that even from a conventional administrative
standpoint, the officials of the USAID mission to the
Northeast were functioning on weak premises.
The Assault of Foreign Aid in Retrospect.

The failure of

the Alliance for Progress to substantially change the con
ditions of poverty and privation in Northeast Brazil stems
in large measure from the severity of those problems.
However, perhaps an even greater obstacle to success was
the central fallacy around which the Alliance was construc
ted *

that political stability would accompany social and

economic development.

Huntington has referred specifical

ly to this inconsistency in the program.
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With the Alliance for Progress in 1961, social reform—
that is, the more'equitable distribution of material
and symbolic resources— joined economic development as
a conscious and explicit goal of American policy toward
..... .
modernizing countries.
...the relationship between social reform and politi
cal stability resembles that between economic develop
ment and political stability. In some circumstances
reforms may reduce tensions and encourage peaceful
rather than violent change. In other circumstances,
however, reform may well exacerbate tensions, precip
itate violence, and be a catalyst of rather than a
substitute for revolution,70
The primary inability of the Alliance to effect its explic
it goals might be explained in terras of the innate impos
sibility of those goals.

Furthermore, the constant

changes that occurred after 1961 in the definition of U.S.
national interests, especially In the area of internation
al security, contributed to the contradiction.

As soon

as foreign assistance to Northeast Brazil became identi
fied with the war against communism, it became imperative
for the sake of U.S. institutional coherence to use it as
a weapon, and to destroy in many cases rather than to
bulid with it.
Although some observers, including Huntington,
indict the Alliance for Progress because of its contra
dictory premises, they tend to identify the souce of
the contradiction as implicit to the Charter of Punta del
Este, and not reflective of a basic transformation of pol
icy after the fact.

Huntington emphasizes that "in fact,

economic development and political stability are two in-
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dependent goals and progress toward one has no necessary
71
connection with progress toward another."
Officials
charged with these unrelated goals soon realized their
plight, and in the struggle to achieve coherent insti
tutional functions that ensued, the primary goal of poli
tical stability was affirmed.

Since the goal of political

stability did not, in this case, correspond with economic
and social development goals agreed upon in the Charter
of Punta del Este, efforts in these latter areas were in
creasingly limited.

Agrarian reform and education pro

grams made way for high impact school construction program
ing.
The Charter of Punta del Este, which brought
about the Alliance for Progress, included concrete ob
jectives which at least two critics are convinced "can
now be used as yardsticks against which to measure its
72
performance."
The first of these was the achievement
of an economic growth rate of "not less than 2.5 percent
per capita per year." in each of the countries implement
ing the program.

This was seen at the time as a for

midable challenge considering the Latin American popu
lation growth rate of about 3 percent,^

and a population

growth rate in Northeast Brazil from 17.875 million in
7k

1950 to 22.427 million in i960.

A second objective stipulated in the Alliance
charter was to provide "a more equitable distribution of
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national income.”

Still other objectives included

trade diversification, greater use of Latin American hu
man and natural resources, significant increases in per
capita food production, agrarian reform, eradication of
adult illiteracy, specific health goals(according to
the needs of each country), and increased low-income
housing.76
The first step toward achievement of all these objec
tives was to be the formulation of national develop
ment programs on the principles of self help and "the
maximum use of domestic resources, taking into account
the special conditions of each country," but including
the "necessary structural reforms."77
A primary goal of the Alliance for Progress, the
provision of political stability and hemispheric security,
was not stated officially, but soon became apparent to
many observers.

Robock remarked that "by mid i960 the

total of all United States and United Nations technical
assistance to Northeast Brazil, the most extensive area
of poverty in the Western Hemisphere, had increased to'
the level of about fifteen technical experts and an annual
expenditure of about $500,000."

He added that "the pros-

pects for much greater United States help continued dim."
However, i960 was coincidently the year that Fidel Castro
made his political allegiance publicly known, and the
gravitation of Cuba toward the Soviet bloc resulted in a
dramatic change in U.S. attitudes toward Latin America.
Northeast Brazil suddenly became an important laboratory

7 ft
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for United States foreign policy techniques in the hemi
sphere.
Northeast Brazil, almost by chance, became a "cause
celebre." With the United States embassy, New York
Times, and the National Broadcasting Company discov
ery of "Marxist" Francisco Juiiao and the Peasant
land reform movement in the Northeast, the stage was
set by late i960 for Northeast Brazil to receive
prompt and high level attention from the new admini
stration. Almost immediately after President Ken
nedy took office a series of urgent visits were made
to the Northeast by White House officials, Adlai
Stevenson, and others. Gelso Furtado, the head of
SUDENE, was invited to Washington to confer with
President Kennedy and others,'9
The United States later put aside $33 million for an immediate action program,

80

and followup programs m

the

Northeast lasted the duration of the Alliance.
It is doubtful even if the Alliance for Progress
was successful in accomplishing its unwritten goal of
mitigating the influence of castroism in Northeast Brazil.
The Alliance achieved a reputation during its decade of
existence for continually shifting its program emphasis,
but it is possible to say definitively political and
socioeconomic patterns in the Northeast remain relatively
/

static.

Levinson and Onis conclude that*

If it has succeeded in preventing any new Castros
from coming to power in the hemisphere, it has done
so by military means, failing conspicuously to ad
vance the cause of the democratic left. The United
States has intervened openly in the Dominican Re
public, and less obviously in Brazil and Guatamala
to assist not the democratic left but the military
and civilian forces of conservatism.®1
Both the implicit and explicit goals of the Alliance seem
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to have eluded it during its decade of existence.

Roett's

comment remains valid in retrospect.
The United States in the 1960s found itself in the
awkward position of advocating political and social
mobilization in underdeveloped nations while pos
sessing and using foreign aid as an instrument to
impede modernization inftthe name of national and
international security. ^
Implications for the Future.

The counterproductivity of

the Alliance for Progress program in Northeast Brazil with
regards to the specific aims of political and socio-econ
omic development was probably due to the condition of
competition generated between the U.S. program and the
SUDENE.

To argue that the Alliance for Progress contained

a covert goal, one which it achieved with a reasonable
degree of success, is to ignore the firm commitment that
the United States made in the Charter of Punta del Este
to take certain political risks for the sake of modernizing
Latin American society.

Although it has to be recognized

that all nations, and especially the "superpowers", have
specific national interests which must always prevail over
their philanthropic enterprises, the procedures which led
to the identification of those interests in Northeast
Brazil can be said to have been both erroneous and dis
parate.

Robock underscored this point in his 1963 report.

With political goals being so important, the United
States needs a clear picture of the Specific kinds of
political developments in Northeast Brazil that would
be considered successful foreign aid results. The de
velopment of such criteria,requires, of course, a

12?

thorough knowledge of Brazil's political system and
political styles, including a sophisticated and ob
jective understanding of communism, left-wing move
ments, nationalism, anti-Americanism, and the roles
of the church and the military within the Brazilian
setting. To interpret Brazilian political events
within the context of United States political stan
dards and characteristics, for example, will result
both in ineffective guidance for foreign aid actions
and in erroneous evaluations of the resuits.^3
This straightforward articulation of the dangers of cul
tural naivete on the part of U.S. foreign assistance
officials in Northeast Brazil went unheeded.

Buttressed

f

with vague allusions to "communist conspiracy" and politi
cal "instability", the officials that determined the
policy for the U.S. contribution to the development of
the Northeast quickly discounted their official goals
as pejorative to primary objectives.
The adoption of "high impact" programs by the
USAID mission just prior to 1964 further underscores the
lack of regard that officials had for the provisions of
the Charter of Punta del Este.

Robock discounts their

utility.
The first objection to most impact projects is that
they don't work. It is inconceivable that enough
school buildings, electric light installations, water
systems, and new housing units can be built in a
short period of time to satisfy more than a minute
share of total needs. Therefore, the assumption
must be made that if the "have-not" sees the new
physical facilities, he will be convinced that the
development program he is being asked to support
is eventually going to help him. The basic goal,
therefore, involves expectations rather than im
mediate fulfillment. And the Nordestino is cyni
cal enough after many years of promised panaceas to
need more than the sight of Senhor X— who generally
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has good political connections— getting new facilijr
ties to persuade him that his future is brighter.
It is therefore doubtful if the adoption of high impact
policy in a region which had traditionally been glutted
with this kind of governmental response evinced sound
judgement on the part of the USAID officials.
The blind emphasis on regional development is ano
ther way in which the Alliance for Progress, as a coordi
nated institutional effort, ignored the basic requisites
of political development in Northeast Brazil.

United i

States foreign assistance became incapable of assisting
in the solution of the outstanding problems of the North
east at precisely that juncture in which they were recog-,
nized as exclusively regional in character.

It is the

national scope of most of the problems of the Northeast
which identifies such plans as myopic and conciliatory.
In this context, it is unlikely that substantially in
creased understanding and cooperation between the USAID
mission to the Northeast and the SUDENE would have suf
ficed in and of itself.
al solutions.

National problems require nation

Nevertheless, the legacy of the period be

tween 1961 and 196^ in Northeast Brazil is the imposition
politics at the expense of political development, and a
key experiment in political and socioeconomic change was
consciously and effectively resisted despite the prepon
derance of advice to the contrary.
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CHAPTER IV

POLITICS AND POVERTYt
A CONCLUSION
This thesis has endeavored to explain why govern
ment planning,in the areas of political and economic devel
opment in Northeast Brazil has Been unable to address it
self to the problems of poverty and privation in that
region.

The intensity and scope of these problems is

dramatic, and the region can be compared with sub-Saharan
Africa and the Indian subcontinent despite the growing
opulence of Southern Brazil.

The recurrent droughts, or

secas, further intensify a situation which often leads to
starvation and forced migration of the regions peasants
to other areas.

Powerful regional elites have tradition

ally either resisted all government intervention or, as
in the case of the sugar producers, made use of it solely
for personal gain.
The primary focus of the analysi has been the
Northeast Development Superintendency, or the SUDENE, an
agency which was empowered in 1961, for the first time in
the history of the Northeast, to renovate the region*s
political and economic institutions.
133

The subsequent

134inability of this agency to effect substantive political
and economic change between 1961 and 1964 can be attribut
ed to four primary factors*

first, the structure of this

agency was inextricably bound to competing regional inter
ests; second, the scope of the problems to which it addres
sed itself was, and continues to be, national, not region
al;

third, cultural limitations of the Brazilian bureau

cracy, particularly that of personalism, deprived the
SUDENE of dynamic leadership at a critical juncture; and
fourth, competition between the U.S. development effort
in Northeast Brazil deprived the SUDENE of critical sup
port and exacerbated political tensions to which it had
already become subjected.
The SUDENE was tied to competing regional inter
ests in several ways.

It was structurally committed to

rely upon regional elites in its formulation of policy, It depended upon region-wide cooperation in the implemen
tation of its programs.

Furthermore, by 1961 the small

traditional elite of the Northeast had been challenged
and defeated in several instances by populist politicians,
and the SUDENE became a convenient target for both sides
in the ensuing political struggles.
The poverty and privation of rural Brazil are not
confined to its Northeast.

In attempting to formulate

regional solutions to these problems, the SUDENE was forc
ed to observe national political rules without recourse to
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national resourses.

It was therefore unable to im

plement a comprehensive rural program in the region.
The SUDENE inevitably chose to follow the path of least
resistance and implemented a program of tax write-offs
and minor subsidization to corporations willing to
expand into the Northeast.

Brazilian industrialization,

however, has had relatively little effect on the problems
of the rural sector.
The cultural limitations of the Brazilian bureau
cracy include the tendency to emphasize personalities ra
ther than institutional functions.

The dynamic leader

ship of Celso Furtado, the founder and first superinten
dent of the SUDENE, seriously jepordized the goals of the
agency to the extent that it created a dependency in the
agency on his continual presence.

During the critical

year of 1963* Furtado was absent for prolonged periods
while he completed a five-year plan for Brazilian national
economic development.

At a time when the SUDENE was cal

led upon to respond to a variety of pressures and criti
cisms, it remained weakened and dormant.
Competition between the United States Agency for
International Development mission to the Northeast and
the SUDENE was based in part on all of the three weaknes
ses mentioned above.

Regional elites fostered American

insecurities for the purpose of solidifying their own
position.

The national character of poverty and privation
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in Brazil led some American development strategists to
identify nationalist tendencies as leftist "subversion**.
The weaknesses of Brazilian bureaucracy, and particularly
Furtado*s frequent absences, led to the growth of mis
understanding between the two agencies.

The Alliance

officials came to view the SUDENE as either ignorant of,
or threatening to, American ideals in the Northeast re
gion.

In fact, the United States was committed, through

the Charter of Punta del Este, to support political and
social development efforts, even at the expense of some
degree of hemispheric "security".

The inability of the

U.S. foreign aid program to come to grips with the SUDENE
plan was in large measure self defeating*

the path taken

neither strengthened "security" in the Northeast, nor did
it make a rational use of American funds, as the schoolbuilding program indicated.
The breakdown of the SUDENE prior to 1964 has
extensive implications with regards to regional develop
ment planning in general.

It indicates the need in Brazil

above all else to give national recognition to problems
that are essentially national in character; it implies the
inability of regional programs to address themselves ef
fectively to these problems.

It emphasizes the funda

mental difficulties in directing political and economic
development through personalized bureaucracies.

And it

outlines the inability of foreign development efforts
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and specifically those of "superpowers"— to achieve their
overall objectives while accommodating ulterior purposes,
such as hemispheric "security".
The breakdown of the SUDENE prior to 1964 has
meant, among other things, that the severe problems of
the Northeast continue.

The latifundio system of land

ownership has persisted, and with it the social and po
litical conditions for which the Northeast is notorious.
The failure of the SUDENE has been followed by the
failures of the Alliance for Progress, the GERAN, and
numerous other development projects.

Understanding the

factors which led to this breakdown is of critical rele
vance to a general understanding of why regional develop
ment planning has been unable to alleviate the conditions
of poverty and privation in Northeast Brazil.
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